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MODERNIZING THE BANK CHARTER
DAVID ZARING*
ABSTRACT
The banking charter—the license a bank needs to obtain before it
can open—has become the centerpiece of an argument about what
finance should do for the rest of the economy, both in academia and
at the banking agencies. Some advocates have proposed using the
charter to pursue industrial policy or to end shadow banking. Some
regulators have proposed giving financial technology firms bank
charters, potentially breaking down the traditionally high walls
between banking and commerce. An empirical survey of chartering
decisions by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency suggests
that chartering is best understood as an ultracautious licensing
regime for “fit and proper” applicants. It would not and probably
should not be easily adapted to realize the policies the advocates
propose, or to mix banking with big business. The modern charter
should be paired with more transparent administration by agencies
and more standard review by courts. These policies could appropri-
ately be paired with the careful and narrow fintech chartering
program that regulators have created.
* Associate Professor, The Wharton School. Thanks to Thomas Curry, Brian Feinstein,
Anna Gelpern, Jeremy Kress, Ron Levin, Sarah Light, Saule Omarova, Veronica Root,
Andrew Tuch, Adam White, and participants at presentations at the ALSB Annual Meeting,
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INTRODUCTION
One of the consequences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis was
that it became all but impossible to start a new bank in the United
States, although this policy was never publicly articulated by
anyone. To found a bank, you must obtain deposit insurance and a
bank charter, both of which require approval by the government.1
However, stung by the number of relatively young banks that failed
during the crisis, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
stopped giving out deposit insurance and the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC), the main federal regulator that charters
banks, did not formally respond to any charter application for
years.2
The prohibition against start-up banking could not last forever,
and—again, without notice—recently, the FDIC has grudgingly
started to do something about granting deposit insurance to newly
chartered banks, or at least say something about the subject.3 The
OCC has cautiously moved towards granting new charters for
banks, and even for some technology firms that are not banks.4 The
Chair of the FDIC said in a speech that a “priority of mine is
encouraging de novo bank formation;”5 in all, this led to fifteen
approvals for new banks in 2018 and nine more in 2019.6
1. How Can I Start a Bank?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.
federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12779.htm [https://perma.cc/HA9K-F2BW].
2. While more than 800 commercial banks vanished between 2007 and 2013, “[t]he OCC
granted only six bank charters in that period,” and between then and 2017, only three more.
The FDIC granted “even fewer deposit insurance applications.” MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL.,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 168 (2d ed. 2018).
3. The current chair of the FDIC, Jelena McWilliams, told the Senate Banking
Committee that “[i]n order for us to replenish the ranks of the specialty community banks, we
need to encourage de novo application[s].” Rachel Witkowski, Floodgates Open? De Novo
Applications Surge at FDIC, AM. BANKER (Oct. 3, 2018, 4:34 PM), https://www.american
banker.com/news/floodgates-open-de-novo-applications-surge-at-fdic [https://perma.cc/UCM4-
4B7B]. 
4. See infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text (reviewing the press conference held
by the Comptroller of the Currency upon the grant of the OCC’s first charter in years in 2017).
5. Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Florida Bankers Association
Leadership Dinner: Banking on the American Dream (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/speeches/spjan3119.html [https://perma.cc/7CUT-6K85].
6. Dan Ennis, De Novo Activity Fell in 2019 Despite FDIC Plea, BANKING DIVE (Jan. 3,
2020) https://www.bankingdive.com/news/de-novo-activity-fell-2019-fdic/569775/ [https://
1400 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1397
The apparent end of the no-charter era calls for a reassessment.
How should the government use its charter-granting powers, now
that it has apparently decided that new banks are permitted?
Academics and regulators have come to entirely different views. A
number of banking law scholars have argued that the charter
should be given out parsimoniously and in exchange for a commit-
ment by new banks (and old ones for that matter) to various public
goals.7
The OCC has taken the opposite view. Rather than using the
charter to narrow and direct the banking industry, it has announced
that defining “that which we call a bank”8 should be broadened to
make room for financial technology (or “fintech”) companies as well
as regular, brick-and-mortar banks.9 That means, as the Obama
White House put it, companies making use of a “wide spectrum of
technological innovations which impact a broad range of financial
activities, including payments, investment management, capital
raising, deposits and lending, insurance, regulatory compliance, and
other activities in the financial services space,” might also be able
to obtain a banking license.10
Unlike other corporations, which are entitled to a corporate
charter essentially on demand, bank charters have always been
perma.cc/2M7A-R5CQ].
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. The quote is from an article by a leading banking scholar and a high-profile financial
institutions lawyer. See generally Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We
Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States,
31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 31 (2011) (coining the phrase “that which we call a bank”).
9. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE
INNOVATION IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 2 (Mar. 2016), http://
consumerbankers.com/sites/default/files/OCC%20whitepaper%20fin%20inno%282%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2GS-SM34].
10. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, A FRAMEWORK FOR FINTECH 2 (Jan. 2017), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/documents/A%20Frame
work%20for%20FinTech%20_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q3E-N46D] (defining fintech as
a “wide spectrum of technological innovations which impact a broad range of financial
activities, including payments, investment management, capital raising, deposits and lending,
insurance, regulatory compliance, and other activities in the financial services space”). The
OCC has merely defined fintech firms as those engaged with “financial technology.” See
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 9, at 4. For a discussion, see
William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2018) (“Despite this
explosion in the size and importance of fintech, the industry itself is surprisingly ill defined.”).
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difficult to obtain.11 While corporate charters today permit corpora-
tions to operate for “any lawful purpose,”12 bank charters are only
available for companies engaged in the “business of banking”13—to
the OCC that means taking deposits, making loans, or offering
checking services—and only after considering the “convenience and
needs of the community to be served.”14 Those are only the start of
the requirements. To even apply for a charter, as Bob Hockett and
Saule Omarova have explained, “[b]ank organizers are required to
submit detailed financial information, business plans, and perfor-
mance projections in order to convince chartering authorities of
their ability to provide banking services in a safe and sound
manner.”15
This involved application process presents a challenge for any-
one hoping to start up a “normal” bank. The OCC has occasionally
experimented with the chartering of “special” banks—banks that
perform some, but not all, of the functions of a normal bank.16 These
banks might hold money in trust, but not make loans or issue credit
cards.17
On July 31, 2018, the OCC began accepting applications for its
newest proposal for a special bank—the fintech charter.18 Joseph
11. See Peter C. Carstensen, Restricting the Power to Promote Competition in Banking:
A Foolish Consistency Among the Circuits, 1983 DUKE L.J. 580, 608 (discussing the policy
implications of charter approval, including that “in the broader social view, the decision
whether to have one hundred or one thousand decisionmakers controlling access to credit
seems important”).
12. What Are Articles of Incorporation?, HARBOR COMPLIANCE, https://harborcompliance.
com/information/what-are-articles-of-incorporation [https://perma.cc/66RB-FS8J].
13. The OCC’s rules may be found at 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (2019).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (2018).
15. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank
Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation—and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453, 474-
75 (2016). For a government explanation of the requirements, see supra note 1; see also Anna
Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 394 (2016) (“[A] firm
cannot simply call itself a bank and start selling demand liabilities to the public.”).
16. See infra Part V.C.
17. See infra Part V.C. So far, the largest credit card networks have required banks to
obtain deposit insurance to participate in the network. See Andrew Kahr, Why Allow Only
Banks to Issue Credit Cards?, AM. BANKER (Aug. 22, 2012, 11:26 AM), https://www.american
banker.com/opinion/why-allow-only-banks-to-issue-credit-cards [https://perma.cc/9N9L-TF4R].
18. On that day, the OCC issued a supplement to its licensing manual that “provides
detail on how the OCC would evaluate applications for a special purpose national bank
charter from fintech companies.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LICENSING
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
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Otting, the head of the Agency, said that “[t]he decision to consider
applications for special purpose national bank charters from in-
novative companies helps provide more choices to consumers and
businesses, and creates greater opportunity for companies that want
to provide banking services in America.”19 The nascent national
fintech charter has support from the Democrat and Republican
Comptrollers of the Currency who preceded Otting.20 The Treasury
Department has also expressed support, predicting that peer-to-
peer lenders and payments processors might be particularly well
served by the charter.21
The fintech charter has opponents as well, especially those who
are concerned that fintech charters could obliterate the traditional
distinction between banking and commerce. Some of the largest fin-
tech operations in the country include PayPal, Amazon’s payment
system, and Apple and Google’s wallets.22 Should these firms have
bank charters? They could then compete against banks in every
way, rather than only through payment processing, which would
make them ultimate “shadow banks.”23 Senators Sherrod Brown
COMPANIES 1 (July 2018), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/
comptrollers-licensing-manual/files/pub-considering-charter-apps-from-fin-tech-co.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L4YW-E5VY].
19. OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology
Companies, OFFICE COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (July 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/KE2N-VE8K].
20. See infra notes 355-60 and accompanying text (reviewing supportive statements by
Comptroller Thomas Curry and Acting Comptroller Keith Noreika).
21. See infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
22. Or they would be the largest if spun off. See Jim Marous, Google, Apple, Facebook and
Amazon Should Terrify Banking, FIN. BRAND (Aug. 6, 2014), https://thefinancialbrand.com/
41484/google-apple-facebook-amazon-banking-payments-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/4DHT-
P2H2]. PayPal, a subsidiary of eBay, has been recently valued at $61.6 billion. Luke Christou,
PayPal Net Worth Has Surpassed Parent Company eBay, NS BUS. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.
ns-businesshub.com/popular/paypal-net-worth/ [https://perma.cc/5XH8-2DA8]. The largest
standalone fintechs by estimated market capitalization are Stripe, the payments processor,
at $9.2 billion, and SoFi, the peer-to-peer lender, at $4.3 billion. Sally French, These Are the
Most Valuable Fintech Companies in America, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 16, 2017, 2:47 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-are-the-most-valuable-fintech-companies-in-
america-2017-11-15 [https://perma.cc/75AK-M2GB].
23. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 279-80 (Fall 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/2010b_bpea_gorton.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VGY-FJ84]; see also JOHN
ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 445-48 (2016); ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL.,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS: SHADOW BANKING 2-3 (Feb. 2012),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf [https://
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(D-OH) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR) have argued that “[o]ffering a new
charter to nonbank companies seems at odds with the goals of
financial stability, financial inclusion, consumer protection, and
separation of banking and commerce.”24 State banking supervisors
have posited that “[a]n OCC fintech charter is a regulatory train
wreck in the making” and have sued, with some success, to stop it
from happening.25 Karen Petrou, a leading financial policy analyst,
perma.cc/4EJM-VGYP]. Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick define shadow banking with
reference to three factors: a business relying on (1) short-term liabilities and (2) backing
potentially illiquid assets (3) when the traditional restrictions and backstops of bank
regulation are not present. See Gorton & Metrick, supra, at 280. In their relatively popular
view, shadow banks are, by definition, not regulated like banks, but provide financing like
banks. See Gorton & Metrick, supra, at 261. In the past decades the shadow banks have taken
market share from conventional institutions. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 678, 691 (2013) (“Partially as a result of private exchanges and dark pools, a ‘shadow
banking’ infrastructure now casts a large penumbra over the financial system.”). These
shadow banks include money market funds that finance the day-to-day operations of large
firms with their appetite for commercial paper, venture capital funds that finance and develop
new businesses, business development corporations that invest in small and midsize firms,
and hedge funds that can take on any of these functions, along with others. See Edward
McBride, Shadow and Substance, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2014, at 3, https://www.economist.com/
sites/default/files/20140510_international_banking.pdf [https://perma.cc/83RJ-T8CE]
(reviewing the various sorts of firms that can be characterized as shadow banks and the sort
of services they provide).
24. Lalita Clozel, OCC Fintech Charter Sparks Opposition from Senate Dems, AM. BANKER
(Jan. 9, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/occ-fintech-charter-sparks-
opposition-from-senate-dems [https://perma.cc/SKX3-E9EM] (quoting statement and
reviewing the opposition to the mooted charter).
25. John W. Ryan, CSBS Responds to Treasury, OCC Fintech Announcements, CONF. ST.
BANKING SUPERVISORS (July 31, 2018), https://www.csbs.org/csbs-responds-treasury-occ-
fintech-announcements [https://perma.cc/L5V8-FGXX]. For one complaint, see Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, No. 18-cv-02449, 2019 WL 4194541 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2018). For
the New York Department of Financial Services statement about its lawsuit against the OCC,
see Statement by Acting Financial Services Superintendent Linda A. Lacewell Regarding the
Court’s Decision to Allow DFS’s Lawsuit Against the OCC to Move Forward, N.Y. ST. DEP’T
FIN. SERVS. (May 2, 2019), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/statements_
comments/2019/st1905021 [https://perma.cc/Q2VM-ZZUU]. For a collection of opposing
perspectives, see Ed Mierzwinski, Leading Groups Oppose OCC Proposal to Charter Fintechs,
U.S. PUB. INT. RES. GRP. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://uspirg.org/blogs/eds-blog/usp/leading-groups-
oppose-occ-proposal-charter-fintechs [https://perma.cc/HU59-4TNF] (collecting statements of
opposition and noting that “we joined leading consumer organizations to criticize a proposal
by the chief national bank regulator known as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency”).
In three of the four cases, the suits against the fintech charter have been dismissed as
premature. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of Comptroller of Currency,
No. 18-CV-2449 (DLF), 2019 WL 4194541, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019) (discussing two suits
filed in Washington, D.C., seeking to dismiss the litigation; “because” nothing alleged in a
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has concluded that people are likely to get “hurt” by the fintech
charter.26
The banking charter has thus become the centerpiece of an
argument about what chartered institutions should do for the rest
of the economy. The chartering process also illustrates a remark-
able divergence—worryingly common in banking regulation—be-
tween the law as written and the law as it is actually applied.
I argue that the best way to understand the OCC’s chartering
practice, at least as expressed through its written orders, is that it
is engaged in “fit and proper” regulation, determining whether the
promoters of a new bank are sufficiently experienced, adequately
capitalized, and disinclined to break the law.27 Chartering as prac-
ticed is not a philosophical debate about what banking is and should
be, but a business viability analysis. When the OCC does grant a
charter, it does so in a pro forma letter, without many conditions
(though there are usually some) or even applications of the law to
the facts of the submission.28 It does not suggest that it is making
decisions on policy grounds.29
But while writing an order approving or denying a chartering
application looks easy, the actual application process is, it turns
out, quite hard. Lawyers will tell you that behind the orders there
is also a searching inquiry into the quality and viability of the
business plan of the would-be bank and the track record of its
managers. While the test is best characterized as a fit and proper
second complaint “cure[s] the original jurisdictional deficiency” identified in CSBS I “[i]ssue
preclusion bars [the court] from reconsidering whether [CSBS] suffered Article III injury.”).
See also Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of the Currency, No. 17 CIV. 3574 (NRB), 2017 WL
6512245, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (“[P]laintiff ’s claims are not ripe”). In one district
court decision, now on appeal, the states won their substantive case. Vullo v. Office of
Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding the proposed
fintech charter to exceed OCC’s authority to only regulate banks).
26. Penny Crosman, ‘A Lot of People Are Going to Get Hurt’: Petrou on Fintech Risk, AM.
BANKER (Feb. 4, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-lot-of-people-are-
going-to-get-hurt-petrou-on-fintech-risk [https://perma.cc/ZQH2-3GT8] (discussing a report
by a well-known financial services analyst worrying about “new forms of bias, threats to data
privacy, security violations, misleading marketing and even systemic risk”).
27. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING
MANUAL: CHARTERS 4 (Sept. 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/
publications/comptrollers-licensing-manual/files/charters.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD3F-TP2H].
28. See id. at 39.
29. See id.
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test,30 because it focuses on the management team and the busi-
ness plan, it is certainly fit and proper with teeth.
This caution on chartering new banks also applies—it seems so
far—to the OCC’s approach to fintech. Rather than fully commit-
ting to the revolutionary promise of the fintech charter, the OCC
has moved slowly in developing it.31 Previous special charters have
not exactly transformed the financial industry; they have largely
gone to subsidiaries of already extant banks, offering established
incumbents the chance to add services such as credit cards or trust
deposits to their customers.32 Nor has the OCC dispensed these
charters easily or broadly. The OCC’s approach to the fintech char-
ter should be welcomed.
In documenting these practices, this Article provides the first
comprehensive account of how chartering works on the ground since
Kenneth Scott’s government-funded analysis of the charter in 1975
appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review.33
It also offers four actionable prescriptions to policymakers. The
first is directed to the OCC and FDIC, which should issue guidance
reflecting their willingness to entertain charter applications by new
banks, guidance that they can update when they feel that conditions
warrant. The ban on start-up banking from 2010-2018 has been
nothing less than secret law, and there is no good reason not to
publicly announce a halt on accepting banking applications if
regulators feel economic conditions warrant it—and, by the same
token, to publicly update that guidance when conditions have im-
proved.
The second is directed at courts, which should, the next time they
hear a dispute over a charter grant, definitively apply Chevron
deference and “hard look” review to the decision by the regulators.
This is the ordinary standard for licensing decisions, but one that
30. See id. at 4.
31. See infra Part V.E.
32. See infra Part V.D.
33. The last comprehensive empirical account was provided by Kenneth Scott in his
comprehensive article In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking
Agencies. See generally Kenneth E. Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the
Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1975). The article, and its conclusion that
charter acquisitions should be liberalized, generated a frustrated response from an OCC
official. See C. Westbrook Murphy, What Reason for the Quest?: A Response to Professor Scott,
42 U. CHI. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (1975).
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has not been articulated or applied to chartering decisions by the
OCC, where instead lawyers have apparently concluded that a
vague super-deference is the appropriate standard.34
The third is also directed at courts, which should conclude that
the fintech charter, as OCC has articulated it, should be deemed to
be within the power of the Agency and a reasonable interpretation
of its statutory authority, with some promise to offer consumers
inexpensive access to financial services. Once the actual practice of
federal bank chartering is understood, the decision by the OCC to
proceed with a fintech charter looks sober and defensible. Fintechs
are not dissimilar to the credit card banks that OCC already
charters, and that do not, like fintech charters, take much in the
way of deposits.35
The fourth is directed at Congress, which should, if it wishes to
have firms such as Amazon enter the business of banking (as
Amazon’s Chinese equivalent has done in China),36 pass a fintech
chartering act expressing its permission.
Extending the banking charter to big tech would be the sort of
major question for which banking regulators alone should not be
responsible. The OCC has been given the power to define what a
bank should do—the Supreme Court has held that “the ‘business of
34. At least not until a recent and unpersuasive district court decision concluded that the
Agency could not charter fintechs that did not take deposits. See Vullo v. Office of Comptroller
of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (applying the Chevron test to the OCC’s
decision to accept fintech charter applications). The Chevron standard is the one most often
applied by courts reviewing legal decisions by agencies. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The standard of review under Chevron consists
of two steps. For the first step, the reviewing court must ask whether, after “employing
traditional tools of statutory construction,” it is evident that “Congress had an intention on
the precise question at issue.” Id. at 843 n.9. If so, the statute is “unambiguou[s],” and the
agency must not differ from Congress’s clearly expressed command. Id. at 842-43. If, however,
the court decides that the statute is ambiguous, it then moves to step two of the inquiry. That
step requires the court to uphold the agency’s interpretation so long as it is “based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. Appellate courts have interpreted this to
mean that they must defer to any reasonable interpretation of the statute offered by the
agency. See id. at 845. “Hard look” review looks at the way the agency made its decision,
including how it applied the law to the facts of the case. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 54-57 (1983).
35. See infra notes 331-33.
36. Frank Tong, Alibaba and Partners Obtain a Banking License in China, DIGITAL COM.
360 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2014/10/02/alibaba-and-partners-
obtain-banking-license-china/ [https://perma.cc/EZ2T-M8P8].
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banking’ is not limited to the enumerated powers” listed in the
OCC’s governing statute “and that the Comptroller therefore has
discretion to authorize activities beyond those specifically enumer-
ated.”37 But the OCC has never given out charters willy-nilly; it has
insisted that its charter holders perform “at least one of the
following three core banking functions: receiving deposits; paying
checks; or lending money,”38 and it has almost always prohibited
firms engaged in other businesses from offering some of those core
banking functions.39
As Chief Justice John Marshall observed, there are differences
between “those important subjects, which must be entirely regu-
lated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which
a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are
to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”40
Chartering fintechs that only do finance—a hot but small part of the
financial marketplace41—is consistent with the OCC’s legal
authority to define the details of the business of banking. Charter-
ing Amazon’s payment system, however, would be a major question
requiring congressional authorization before being undertaken by
the OCC.
In what follows, I first review the law of charter applications.42 I
then consider the recent calls for more constraints on the bank
charter and pair them with a broader critique of licensing that has
spurred litigation and criticism of anticompetitive and bureaucratic
state occupational licensing components.43 I suggest that banking—
a dangerous, but heavily regulated activity44—offers a good test of
37. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258-59 n.2
(1995).
38. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2019). 
39. See, e.g., Garrett Fischer & Sarah Wade, OCC Won’t Allow Fintech National Bank
Charters for Commercial Firms, Addressing Potential Walmart Fintech Bank Concerns,
THOMPSON COBURN LLP (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/
bank-check/post/2017-03-17/occ-won-t-allow-fintech-national-bank-charters-for-commercial-
firms-addressing-potential-walmart-fintech-bank-concerns [https://perma.cc/4S7R-H9G9]  (dis-
cussing how nonbank commercial businesses such as Walmart are not usually permitted to
offer banking services).
40. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
41. See French, supra note 22.
42. See infra Parts I and II.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr., Choices in Banking Policy, 80 ECON. Q. 1, 2 (1994)
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the general value of licensing in the modern administrative state.
I then turn to the empirical account of the actual practice of the
OCC when it comes to charter grants using legal, qualitative, and
mildly quantitative methods.45 After that, I turn to the Agency’s
efforts to create a fintech charter, nascent though they are, and
conclude with an evaluation of the policy benefits and costs of that
charter.46 A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE LAW OF CHARTERING
Chartering creates a bank, and with it, an intensely regulated
relationship with the government that begins with the searching
examination of charter applicants and continues with the high-
touch supervision bank regulators impose on banks during their
existence. Holding a charter nonetheless has its appeal, especially
because it, and it alone, offers “the ability to take deposits from the
public, which provides an extremely cheap source of funding,” as
Michael Barr, Howell Jackson, and Margaret Tahyar have put it.47
Banks pay depositors—especially these days—very little by way of
interest, while other businesses cannot hope to borrow as inexpen-
sively.48
The OCC’s authority to grant charters comes from the National
Banking Act, which outlines the Agency’s powers, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, which requires banks seeking deposit in-
surance to obtain a charter.49 The Agency’s practice for assessing
charter applications follows two steps.50 First, it considers whether
to grant preliminary conditional approval for organizers who seek
to create a new bank.51 Second, final approval requires that the
organizers establish over the course of a year that they have met the
standards of the OCC, as set forth in its regulations, and the
(“Banking is one of the most heavily regulated of all industries.”).
45. See infra Part IV.
46. See infra Part V.
47. BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 184.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 22, 24, 26, 27 (2018); id. § 1814.
50. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 3.
51. See id.
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conditions imposed in the conditional approval order, if any.52 Final
approval means that “the bank can begin to conduct banking
business.”53 Preliminary approval allows the organizers of a would-
be bank to raise capital and begin to meet the Comptroller’s reg-
ulatory requirements.54
The OCC has said that in evaluating a charter application, it
considers whether the organizers are familiar with OCC regula-
tions, are competent, have created a board of directors with the
ability to understand the types of services that the bank seeks to
provide, and that the bank has provided for sufficient capital to
meet the requirements of the organizers’ business plan.55 It rejects
applications where there is a risk of immediate recourse to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Fund.56 More controversially, it also is
required to consider “[t]he convenience and needs of the community
to be served.”57 This public interest standard is one of the chief legal
hooks on which bank reformers have hung the idea that banks
should be compelled to take on public duties—though meeting it has
not appeared to induce regulators to gesture at such a conclusion in
the past.
The most important factors for the Agency—both as evidenced in
its orders and application materials and as sensed by would-be
applicants—concern the business plan of the bank and the experi-
ence of the promoters behind it.58 Unlike the case with corporate
chartering, where anyone can create a corporation for any lawful
purpose, the OCC expects the organizing group behind a bank char-
ter application to include promoters with diverse business and
financial interests and even a degree of community involvement.59
Factors that may be considered in assessing the quality of the
application include size of the organizing group, the history of that
group, and the group’s choice of chief executive officer.60
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 4. For a discussion, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION
§ 2.02 (2d ed. Supp. IV 2019).
56. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 4.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (2018); see also 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(h)(5)(i) (2019).
58. See infra Part IV.A.
59. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 6.
60. See id. at 4, 6-7.
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In all, the OCC’s licensing manual on charters amounts to 131
pages of requirements that banks must meet, making it fair to say
that the ability to create a bank is considerably more constrained
than the ability to create a nonbank corporation.61 Moreover, the
manual is no checklist—would-be charter holders must meet with
OCC officials and present their case for the chartering application.62
Feedback will be given, making the application process a meeting-
oriented and iterative one.63 Moreover, received applications are
opened for a period of public comment, meaning that potential
competitors can weigh in with criticism of the application.64
Once the meetings are concluded, the application completed, and
the data provided, the OCC renders its decision without any trial-
type process or opportunity for discovery or cross-examination.65 The
Comptroller is not required to hold a hearing on the record or make
findings of fact in assessing charter applications.66
All of this results in a relatively concise order either granting or
denying the charter application offered in a letter format, as we will
see in Part III. The Supreme Court once called this sort of decision
“curt” as it affirmed it.67
In addition to obtaining a charter from the OCC, the FDIC also
must agree to insure any depositary institutions;68 its willing-
ness to do so is also a constraint, and the application process for
deposit insurance is intensive and document heavy.69 The Federal
Deposit Insurance application is a forty-three-page-long list of
61. See infra Part IV.A. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
supra note 27.
62. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 31-32.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 65.
65. See id. at 64-65.
66. BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 169.
67. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).
68. FDIC Statement of Policy on Applications for Deposit Insurance, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3000.html [https://perma.cc/6WRP-
MJ5L].
69. The FDIC’s recent caution on approving charters has led to some consternation in
Congress: “[S]ince 2011, the FDIC has only approved three de novo bank applications and no
industrial loan company applications. The agency approved only one of two new bank
applications in 2015. Ten years earlier, in 2005, the FDIC approved 237 of 299 de novo
applications.” Steven Harras, House Republicans, FDIC Chief Spar Over Dearth of New
Banks, CONG. Q. ROLL CALL, July 14, 2016, 2016 WL 3751710, at *1.
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requirements, including requests for information about manage-
ment, capital, the needs of the community, the assets held by the
financial institution, its information systems, and a set of certifica-
tions and pledges by the promoters of the institution, including
oaths that must be taken by the directors of the bank that they will
see to their “legal responsibility and ... fiduciary duty to sharehold-
ers to administer the depository institution’s affairs faithfully and
to oversee its management.”70 All of this is in some ways duplicative
of the charter application—but there is no question that any would-
be national bank has two hurdles to surmount from the different
regulators: charter approval and deposit insurance approval.
Judicial review of the OCC’s denial of a charter is available,
though that review has traditionally been limited—Barr, Tahyar,
and Jackson have called it “extraordinary deference.”71 As the
Eighth Circuit has explained,
[T]he trend is for courts to grant some type of judicial review in
many of these administrative type proceedings which concern
the granting of licenses .... a brand of limited review.... The
action of the Comptroller [to deny a charter application] herein
would seem to fall into the general commercial area where
discretionary actions are subject to limited review.72
But the actual standard of review has never been articulated
satisfactorily, partly because banks have stopped contesting char-
tering decisions, given they always seem to lose. The Eighth Circuit
has upheld a Comptroller chartering decision that was “certainly
not without some support in the record.”73 Other courts have con-
cluded that “the Comptroller’s decision is entitled to a presumption
of regularity,”74 and the Supreme Court affirmed that “curt” letter
70. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., INTERAGENCY CHARTER AND FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
APPLICATION 2-7, 10-14, 16-17 https://www.fdic.gov/formsdocuments/interagencycharter-
insuranceapplication.pdf [https://perma.cc/327F-9GFQ].
71. See, e.g., BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 169.
72. Webster Groves Tr. Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1966); see also Pitts,
411 U.S. at 142 (reaffirming the judicial reviewability of OCC decisions, but doing so very
deferentially).
73. First Nat’l Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1974).
74. First Nat’l Bank of Southaven v. Camp, 333 F. Supp. 682, 686 (N.D. Miss. 1971),
aff’d, 467 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1972).
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rejecting an application in Camp v. Pitts.75 It all means, as Margaret
Tahyar has put it, that “a generation has grown to accept that the
granting of bank charters is so up to the discretion of the bank
regulators that the regulator need not even give reasons for a
denial.”76
The Supreme Court has given the OCC Chevron deference on its
other interpretations of the National Banking Act suggest-
ing—though it has never held—that Chevron deference would be
applied to chartering decisions too.77 The D.C. Circuit has also
counselled deferring to the “expert financial judgment” of the
Comptroller.78
The litigation risk of a reversal of chartering decisions by the
OCC is, it is fair to say, low, though not nonexistent.79 One court has
held, applying (as is appropriate) Chevron deference, that the OCC
cannot issue bank charters to fintechs unless they take deposits (a
less appropriate conclusion, as we will see).80 All told, this record of
administrative law deference to the OCC, which has been (though
it should not be) expressed as almost super deference, has arguably
led some claimants aggrieved by a chartering decision to pursue
constitutional claims against the agency, in lieu of administrative
law arguments, without any more success.81
75. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 143.
76. Margaret E. Tahyar, Are Bank Regulators Special? CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.
theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2018/2018-q1-banking-perspectives/articles/are-
bank-regulators-special [https://perma.cc/4U8E-T3CC].
77. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257, 260
(1995) (holding that the National Banking Act is consistent with permitting a bank to sell
annuities). In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, the Court observed that the statutory
phrase “[t]he general business of each national banking association” was ambiguous,
warranting deference to regulatory interpretations of the statute. 479 U.S. 388, 404 (1987).
As the Court observed in Clarke, national banks engage in many activities. See id. at 406-09.
It was accordingly reasonable for the OCC to conclude that incidental services that national
banks could be authorized to provide could be interpreted by the agency to include new sorts
of services. Id. at 409.
78. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that the
municipal bond insurance business was part of the business of banking).
79. As Michael Malloy has observed, “Camp v. Pitts has been widely interpreted as
severely limiting judicial review of the Comptroller’s decisions.” MALLOY, supra note 55, at
§ 1B.02.
80. Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(finding it unambiguous that receiving deposits is an indispensable part of the “business of
banking”).
81. See, e.g., Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of Comptroller of Currency,
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If anything, constitutional doctrine has empowered the OCC
more than it has checked it. A number of courts have held that
the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause supports the National Bank
Act’s preemptive provision overriding state rules that prevent or
significantly interfere with national bank powers, meaning that
OCC charters come with a safe harbor against many state regu-
latory requirements.82
The law of chartering, in sum, gives the OCC a great degree of
latitude in defining the charter, a fact which has not led the agency
to take a “long-arm” or “wildcat”83 view of its powers. Recently, it
bestowed charters unwillingly, despite the flexibility it has been
given.84
The disconnect between unfettered discretion to grant charters
and an unwillingness to do so is always interesting, surprisingly
common in bureaucratic practice, and something of a rebuke to
those who believe that agencies always try to expand their turf. The
OCC has not suggested a desperation to lord over more and more
banks or to stretch the definition of banking to give it jurisdiction
over an ever-greater number of nonbanks, semibanks, or banks-by-
another-name.85
This leads to my first prescription—my recommendation that the
courts explicitly apply Chevron deference and ordinary “hard look”
313 F. Supp. 3d 285, 293 (D.D.C. 2018) (making a Tenth Amendment argument that the court
declined to address as premature); Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 17
Civ. 3574 (NRB), 2017 WL 6512245, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (same).
82. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32-35 (1996);
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Fidelity Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. De
La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982); Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York,
347 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1954). Moreover, for what it is worth, “[r]egulation of national bank
operations is a prerogative of Congress under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses.” Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 22 (2007).
83. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 59, 62 (1996).
84. See infra Part IV.B.
85. The OCC has not tried to establish jurisdiction over payday lenders, mortgage
originators, or title loan companies, for example, even though an empire-building thesis might
predict that it would. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 920 (2005) (questioning the theoretical “basis for believing that
government pervasively seeks to build empire[s] of either the imperialistic or avaricious
variety”); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration,
5 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 547, 601 n.256 (2005) (“I am, as are many observers, very skeptical of
simplistic claims that agencies attempt to maximize turf.”).
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review, not anything “more” than that, to OCC chartering de-
cisions.86 The leading cases setting forth the standard of review for
those decisions were decided before Chevron, and, although they
found that OCC decisions were susceptible to review, they made
that review highly deferential.87 But distinguishing between the
various sorts of deference is difficult, at best, and the Supreme
Court has generally preferred to apply simple and consistent
standards to all agencies.88 Rather than characterizing review of
OCC chartering decisions as barely extant, the better approach
would be to treat the Agency the way other agencies are treated—
there is nothing in its statute or its area of regulation that provides
for anything different.89 Chevron deference and “hard look” review
are the appropriate standard of review of the Agency’s bank-
chartering decisions.
II. MAKING SENSE OF THE CHARTER
If Part I of this Article offers a black-letter account of the law of
chartering, this Part situates the charter in two different ways—
first, as an old-school kind of government grant and second, as the
tool that separates banks from other commercial enterprises. Once
these two critical lenses of chartering are understood, the debate
among scholars and regulators about what a modern banking
charter should look like will make more sense. That is the project of
Part III. Part IV turns from theory to the actual practice of the
Agency in chartering.
A. Charters as Throwback Regulation
A surprising amount of the scholarship critical of the financial
industry in the wake of the financial crisis has sought to recast
86. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for the basic requirements of Chevron and
hard look review.
87. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1120 (2008).
88. See, e.g., id. at 1169.
89. Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 555, 579 (2014) (“Chevron accords deference to all agencies, not just ‘expert’ ones.”).
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banking from a private sector endeavor to a public sector grant. To
these observers, the crisis revealed what we should have known all
along: that the business of finance is essentially a public service
only possible because of the public support that undergirds the
financial system.90 The essential publicness of the provision of
finance justifies an intrusive regulatory hand when it comes to
supervising banks.91 In fact, these scholars see the existence of a
viable banking system as something that is fundamentally derived
from public power.92
This view says banks only work because people believe that they
are safe, and people only believe they are safe because of the gov-
ernment guarantees provided by deposit insurance, the existence of
the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort, and the likelihood
that, if all else fails, banks will be bailed out at taxpayer expense.93
The most important event in a bank’s life, then, is the moment that
the government agrees to allow it to provide banking services—the
day it receives a charter, and with it, the government guarantees
that back up the business of banking.
The implications of the importance of the charter allow for a
much larger government role in directing or supervising banks.
Some scholars wish to replace the relatively unconstrained charters
that national banks currently have with more constrained ones that
would encourage banks to follow government priorities.94 Others
90. As David Millon has observed, “At least through the mid-19th century, incorporation
primarily for private business objectives was relatively unusual. Instead, the typical cor-
poration was chartered to pursue some sort of public function. These corporations included
charitable and municipal corporations as well as privately-owned banking, insurance, and
public utility enterprises.” David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201,
207.
91. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
357, 389 (2016) (“While some measure of the ‘safety’ of ‘safe assets’ comes from private
ordering, government intervention is what actually facilitates the ‘safety’ of these assets.”).
92. See id. at 389-90.
93. See id. at 383, 386-88.
94. See supra note 15; for background the outer limits of these charter constraints, see,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES:
NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 83-84 (July 31, 2018), https://home.treasury.
gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities---
Nonbank-Financials-Fintech-and-Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/82VN-6XV8].
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would rely on the charter to do away with the growing prominence
of shadow banks.95
The turn to charters to do the job makes everything old new
again; my observation about those who believe that charters are
central is that they are emphasizing a way that banking admin-
istrative law differs from contemporary administrative practice.96
Charters and licenses were the principal ways that pre-nineteenth-
century governments raised money or allocated economic re-
sources.97 But now there is no need for royally chartered trading
companies to exploit trade with India or the South Seas, nor to build
bridges and turnpikes to be financed with tolls in the nineteenth-
century manner. Instead, after passage of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA), courts have increasingly urged agencies to prefer
broad, prospectively applied rules to individualized treatments of
particular firms.98 In 1973, the D.C. Circuit exulted over the Federal
Trade Commission’s decision to turn away from its adjudication
model of policy making when it promulgated an octane-labelling
rule, observing that “courts are recognizing that use of rulemaking
to make innovations in agency policy may actually be fairer to
95. See Greg Buchak et al., Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks
5-6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23288, 2017), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w23288.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y58H-FDKT]; see also Kristin N. Johnson, Macro-
prudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 881, 910 (pointing to examples that illustrate “the challenges that the rise of the
shadow banking system creates, the dangers of regulatory arbitrage in the shadow banking
system, and the systemic risk concerns that emerge as shadow banks become more significant
market participants”).
96. The difference is somewhat historical. Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and
Global Capitalism, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 215, 234 (2001) (“[H]istorically, corporations were
chartered only for public purposes, not just for profit.”).
97. See BARR ET AL., supra note 2, at 170 (“Kings often granted exclusive licenses or
monopolies to favored nobles.”). The history is a long one. “During Queen Elizabeth’s very long
reign she oftentimes found herself in need of more money than Parliament had allotted for
her use. As a result, she sometimes tried to supplement her subsidy from Parliament by
selling royal monopolies.” Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the
Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 989 (2013).
98. See, e.g., Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 681-83 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Though one can overstate the differences between nineteenth-century administrative law
and what we recognize as administrative law today. As Jerry Mashaw has observed, “The
national government of the United States was an administrative government from the very
beginning of the Republic.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law
in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1366 (2010).
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regulated parties than total reliance on case-by-case adjudication.”99
Chartering is an old school example of adjudication—an individual-
ized determination after a review of the record.
Outside of finance, for regulated industries in ongoing relation-
ships with their regulators, regularly passed rules are the much
more common regulatory mechanism and, indeed, probably the
more modern approach.100 Most scholars would say that one of the
most important developments in administrative law since the 1980s
has been the rise and rise of the White House’s Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which reviews major rules before
agencies are permitted to promulgate them; that review is generally
perceived to be searching and important.101 The ascent of OIRA
illustrates the importance of the rule in the modern administrative
state.
But its evolution also underscores the independence of the OCC—
OIRA does not review its rules or its licensing decisions.102 The
OCC’s chartering determinations are elaborate permitting process-
es that it, and it alone, assesses.103 This is not to say that chartering
is wrong—or that there are not other parts of the government that
99. Nat’l Petroleum, 482 F.2d at 681.
100. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1383-85, 1404 n.69 (2004) (“To say that there was a debate, however, implies more
diversity of opinion than can be found in that literature.... [T]he drift of these articles [in
administrative law scholarship] was fairly uniform: agencies should use rulemaking more
often than they did.”). As Donald Hornstein has put it,
[T]he triumph of rulemaking also reflected the growing conviction that the world
was better understood and policy better made through the analytical approach
of “comprehensive rationality,” by which goals and means would be fully
specified, compared, and chosen synoptically via techniques such as formal
decision theory or cost-benefit analysis, as opposed to a world view shaped
“incrementally” through a pattern of case-by-case experimentation and
adjustment.
Donald T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of Ex Post Lawmaking, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 1549, 1561 (2011).
101. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (2006) (“[M]any of the features of OMB review create
a profound institutional bias against regulation.”).
102. This is a recent development, however, “prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, all OCC rule
making that constituted a significant regulatory action included a formal assessment of the
action’s costs and benefits, which was submitted to OIRA for review.” Robert P. Bartlett III,
The Institutional Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale of Four
Paradigms?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S379, S385 (2014).
103. See id.
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rely on licensing regimes that generally evade White House
supervision, ranging from nuclear power to telecommunications.
Rather, it is a reminder of how atavistic these sorts of licensing
regimes can be.
B. Banking Versus Commerce
There is a classic debate about financial regulation that turns
on a business model question: whether the business is being op-
erated as a bank or as some other sort of commerce. Would-be banks
are entitled to banking charters, while commercial enterprises are
not.104
This effort to police the divide between banking and commerce
goes back to the original federal banking charter statute, which
limited eligibility for the charter to those engaged in the “business
of banking.”105 Ever since, the OCC has insisted that national
charter holders be “banks”; it has refused, with limited exceptions,
to let nonbanks hold national banking charters, while even tough
regulators such as the FDIC have allowed this on occasion.106 When,
after the financial crisis, the OCC was given responsibility over a
number of thrifts owned, by a quirk of history, by nonbanks, it
encouraged these firms to rid themselves of the charter.107 As Saule
Omarova has observed, the “separation of banking and commerce is
one of the fundamental principles underlying the U.S. system of
bank regulation,” and has been justified by the “needs to preserve
the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions, to
ensure a fair and efficient flow of credit to productive economic
enterprise, and to prevent excessive concentration of financial and
economic power in the financial sector.”108
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
105. Id.
106. See infra Part V.D.
107. Congress was not too enamored of the prospect that nonbanks could operate thrift
subsidiaries; it forbade holding companies the right to purchase or operate thrifts without
first converting to thrift holding companies, which would be subject to supervision by federal
regulators, though it permitted firms that already held a single thrift charter to hold on to
them. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 401, 113 Stat. 1435 (1999) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(9) (2012)).
108. Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Com-
modities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 273, 275 (2013); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon's Antitrust
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At the same time, policymakers have often wondered whether the
separation of banking and commerce makes sense. President
Trump’s first head of the OCC, Acting Comptroller Keith Noreika,
argued that “[t]he recent financial crisis actually demonstrated that
there is nothing inherently safer about separating banking and
commerce.”109 He argued that extending the charter to nonbanks
“has the virtue of bringing technology oriented financial companies
that provide banking services out of the shadows.”110 The veteran
financial free marketeer Peter Wallison is all for erasing the barrier
and thinks it possible: “Thankfully, current policy makes removing
the line between banking and commerce, once and for all, relatively
straightforward.”111
The separation between banking and commerce is, moreover,
threatened by facts on the ground. The rise of so-called shadow
banks, firms that provide some of the services of banks without
holding bank charters, is the second most consequential develop-
ment of finance this century, after the financial crisis and its
fallout.112 “By 2007, the shadow banking system had total assets of
roughly $6.5 trillion—compared to $4 trillion for the then five major
securities firms and $6 trillion for the top five U.S. bank holding
Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 794 (2017) (the reasons for the separation of banking and
commerce have “included the needs to preserve the safety and soundness of insured
depository institutions, to ensure a fair and efficient flow of credit to productive [businesses],
and to prevent excessive concentration of financial and economic power in the financial
sector”).
109. Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at The Clearing
House Annual Conference 7 (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/
speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-134.pdf [https://perma.cc/B857-Q83Y]. For a more general
discussion of the issues, see Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 385, 388-89 (2012) (“[S]eparating banking and commerce
through the BHCA has caused and exacerbated the precarious structure of modern banking.”).
110. Sylvan Lane, Bank Regulator Defends National Fintech Charter Plan, THE HILL (July
19, 2017, 5:47 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/342810-bank-regulator-defends-national-
fintech-charter-plan [https://perma.cc/3Y3C-CTNJ].
111. Peter J. Wallison, Why Are We Still Separating Banking and Commerce?, AM. BANKER
(July 27, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-are-we-still-
separating-banking-and-commerce [https://perma.cc/RHP7-CRMM]; see also Brian Knight,
Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 136
(2017) (discussing the way that fintech avoids traditional categorization).
112. It certainly led to a sea change in the approach to the regulation of the financial
sector, as the D.C. Circuit has recognized. See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 818
F.3d 716, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Enacted two years after the financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-
Frank Act spelled a sea change in the regulation of the nation’s financial markets.”).
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companies,” Chuck Whitehead has observed.113 John Coffee contends
that “[t]he pervasive underregulation of ‘shadow banking,’ which
continued for decades, was a leading cause of the 2008 financial
debacle and the current economic stagnation.”114 As Adam Levitin
has observed, the shadow banking sector has survived the crisis and
is diverse and growing:115
Several distinct but interconnected shadow banking markets
have emerged in recent years, including asset-backed commer-
cial paper (ABCP), auction-rate securities (ARS), hedge funds,
money market mutual funds (MMMF), repurchase agreements
(repos), and credit derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS)
and total return swaps (TRS).116
Today, the shadow banking component of the global economy has
been estimated at forty-five trillion dollars by the Financial
Stability Board, a network of regulators.117
Perhaps the most interesting parts of this new financial sector
are those firms seeking to combine finance and technology in some
way that would permit them to offer financial services to customers
over the Internet.118 Some fintech shadow banks provide loans, peer-
to-peer lenders being the most prominent example.119 Others ser-
vice debt, such as student loan debt.120 And many online platforms
113. Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 27 (2010).
114. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1079 (2012).
115. See Levitin, supra note 91, at 359-61.
116. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 464-65 (2011) (footnote
omitted); see also J. Christopher Kojima, Product-Based Solutions to Financial Innovation:
The Promise and Danger of Applying the Federal Securities Laws to OTC Derivatives, 33 AM.
BUS. L.J. 259, 282 (1995) (describing the way that banks have entered in the derivatives
market and how they are regulated there).
117. For the FSB’s account, see Jun Luo, Shadow Banking, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2018,
1:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/shadow-banking [https://perma.cc/H43Y-
9F5D].
118. The examples below are discussed in more detail in Part V.A.
119. One such peer-to-peer lender is SoFi. See, e.g., Leading Peer-to-Peer Lender SoFi
Surpasses Half a Billion Dollars in Loans Funded, SOFI (May 1, 2014), https://www.sofi.com/
press/leading-peer-to-peer-lender-sofi-surpasses-half-a-billion-dollars-in-loans-funded/ [https://
perma.cc/8R7D-4SVZ].
120. See Robert Farrington, New FinTech Companies Aim to Help Student Loan Borrowers,
FORBES (Mar. 19, 2015, 8:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2015/03/19/
new-fintech-companies-aim-to-help-student-loan-borrowers/#14a7d32d7b38 [https://perma.cc/
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are willing to hold money and make payments.121 This is the
strategy of the various online wallets, PayPal and its subsidiary
Venmo being the most prominent.122 Because these are the kinds of
services that banks offer their clients, the ability of online insti-
tutions to offer the services without holding a bank charter makes
them businesses that do bank-like things without the official des-
ignation of a bank or the regulatory protections and requirements
to which banks must adhere.
The actual practice of the OCC is instructive in figuring out how
that Agency plans to deal with the rise and rise of shadow banking.
Its recent fintech charter practice, which is still very much in the
nascent stages, suggests that it will grant charters to nonbanks,
even with the fintech model that the OCC has chosen to welcome
cautiously, as we will see in Part V of this Article.
III. THE GREAT CHARTERING DEBATE
The academic and legal debate over charters can be segmented
into contemporary and historical camps. Today, we see a recent
spate of banking law scholars arguing that the way the license
works justifies turning banks into tools of the state, while gov-
ernment-skeptical observers worry about the development of an
increasingly intrusive “License Raj” in all things, including
banking.123 This maps onto a historical debate that also had two
sides. On one side were the free bankers, seeking loosened credit
and suspicious of the powers of incumbent banks.124 They sought to
broaden access to charters.125 Others, worried about bank collapses,
have tried to limit charter access, meaning that they have been
4CTH-EZCC].
121. See Anne Sraders, Venmo vs. PayPal: What’s the Difference in 2019?, THESTREET (Apr.
7, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/technology/venmo-vs-paypal-14916417 [https://perma.cc/
45AX-VU69] (discussing similarities and differences between Venmo and PayPal).
122. See id.
123. Afra Afsharipour, Rising Multinationals: Law and the Evolution of Outbound
Acquisitions by Indian Companies, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1053 (2011) (“Between 1950
and 1990, the Indian government imposed a system of strict licensing and ‘red tape’
regulations, commonly referred to as the ‘License Raj,’ to govern business development in
India.” (footnotes omitted)).
124. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
125. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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much more demanding in their approach to charter awards.126 A
final way to make sense of the chartering arguments is to see them
as a case study in the broad debate over licensing in general and
whether the United States has too much of it.
A. Could Charters Make for a Better Financial System?
The case for constrained chartering turns on the problems unique
to banks.127 Many think that regularly arriving financial crises
bespeak a combination of problems, including inadequate controls
inside financial institutions and aggressive entry into new, poorly
understood financial markets.128 Sometimes, the internal controls
miss rogue traders—for example, Nicolas Leeson’s hidden trades,
carried out in the Singapore office of one of Britain’s oldest banks,
Barings, brought down that firm in 1995.129 Bruno Iksil’s 2012
unhedged derivatives trades cost J.P. Morgan $6.2 billion in losses
in 2012 and, following investigations by regulators, $920 million
more in fines.130 Sometimes the controls miss bad strategies.131
126. The link between modern libertarians and historical free bankers is incomplete partly
because free banking gave away charters liberally, but, in other ways, rather strictly regu-
lated banks. For example, “[b]ecause free banking laws also obliged banks to fold upon the
first sign of insolvency and tap a sequestered capital reserve, the evidence of bank failure is
actually evidence of a simple sort of discipline that is curiously absent from modern banking.”
David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 342-43 (1993).
127. Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 126 (2013) (“The
banking industry, in particular, has constantly addressed the regulatory implications of new
ways of conducting the very old business of banking.”).
128. Consider, for example, Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to Com-
plexity Capture, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 643, 705-08 (2012) (criticizing the regulatory architecture
designed to address banker incentives and calling instead for structural regulation, or “re-
strictions on firm size or the scope of activities in which firms are permitted to engage that
have the effect of removing the incentives for undesirable behavior”).
129. As Charles Samuelson has explained, “Leeson disappeared from Singapore on
February 23, 1995. By the end of the following day, the 227 year-old bank did not have enough
assets to meet its short-term obligations.” Charles A. Samuelson, The Fall of Barings: Lessons
for Legal Oversight of Derivatives Transactions in the United States, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
767, 767 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
130. See In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig., No. 12 Civ. 03852 (GBD), 2014 WL
1297446, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (describing the so-called “London Whale” affair
in dismissing shareholder litigation over the losses sustained); Simone M. Sepe & Charles K.
Whitehead, Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
655, 656 (2015) (“Bruno Iksil, nicknamed the ‘London Whale’ for the size of his trading
portfolio, was a JPMorgan proprietary trader in his late thirties who realized losses of up to
$6.2 billion in 2012.”); Dominic Rushe, Whale of a Fine: After Blowing $6bn, JP Morgan’s
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These are business failures, but they do give little credit to reg-
ulators charged with monitoring financial institutions for safety and
soundness. The institutions turned out to be unsafe and unsound,
and that fact surprised both managers of the businesses, and the
government agencies who oversaw them.132 A search has unsur-
prisingly gone on for better mechanisms of supervision. Some think
strict constraints on the business of charter holders might help.133
Recent financial regulatory scholars have tried to do more with
chartering. Omarova and Hockett would use the charter as the legal
and conceptual basis for imposing a broader set of responsibilities
on banks.134 Morgan Ricks would heighten the policing of chartering
and regulating banks defined as money creators (who create money
by making loans) and forbid shadow banks from occupying any
space like it—he would defend the charter wall.135 Claire Hill and
Richard Painter make the case for “covenant banking,” which would
expose managers to liability to shareholders for risky practices; this
would modify the charter to manifest this new business relationship
between shareholders and risk committees at the director level.136
This Part of the Article reviews both these proposals in turn; they
make the case for intensive regulation through charters and thus
pose a question: Could the OCC provide this sort of intensive reg-
ulation?
Hockett and Omarova have called the chartering process the
operative feature of the “finance franchise,” arguing that the
traditional public interest component of bank charters could be used
to justify some ends-based oversight of banks, such as requiring
Trader Costs Another $920m, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2013/sep/19/jp-morgan-london-whale-fine-blow [https://perma.cc/29X3-7DJM]
(describing the fines and penalties).
131. For example, the messy fall of Lehman Brothers is reviewed in Steven M. Davidoff &
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 491-93 (2009).
132. See id. at 476.
133. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
136. CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS 146-51
(2015).
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them to align their business models with policies designed to foster
the overall efficiency of the economy.137
They have argued that finance is best understood as a “public-
private franchise” system, in which banks are licensed to engage in
the creation of credit-money, ultimately backed by the sovereign.138
In their view, this makes banks quasi-public institutions providing
a public good—access to credit.139 The analogy is to utilities and
railroads, which are sometimes owned by the state and, when
privatized, are subject to regulation of prices, activities, and the
like.140 The charter is the mechanism through which much of this
control is realized.141 It is a basis to put banks to the service of
industrial policy, or anything, really.
Consider the private cognate of the charter, the licensing pur-
chased from an intensively regulatory business. McDonald’s fran-
chisees, for example, control almost nothing about the businesses
they run.142 Instead, McDonald’s corporate headquarters produces
each uniform, menu item, store design, and equipment.143 By
analogy, the franchisees who help the government generate and
underwrite sufficient amounts of credit to support the economy
could be regulated just as intensively, possibly towards publicly
beneficial ends, such as the direction of investment towards public
137. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
1143, 1149 (2017) (arguing that “redefining the financial system’s core dynamics along the
proposed lines allows for more accurate, less superficial diagnoses of that system’s present
dysfunctions, which fundamentally constitute manifestations of an underlying failure on the
part of the franchisor to modulate and oversee the allocation of credit”).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1213.
140. As they have explained, the category of such institutions “included telegraph, railroad,
gas, and then electric lighting firms, as well as banks, insurance companies, and mutual loan
firms.” Hockett & Omarova, supra note 15, at 468-69.
141. Id. at 475.
142. As the mayor of Seattle has said, “Franchise restaurants have menus that are
developed by a corporate national entity, a food supply and products that are provided by a
corporate national entity, training provided by a corporate national entity, and advertising
provided by a corporate national entity.” Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp.
3d 1256, 1270 (W.D. Wash. 2015), aff’d but criticized, 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
the mayor).
143. See, e.g., Sarah Whitten, Owners of McDonald’s Aren’t Happy with Headquarters as
Promotions Pick Up and Remodeling Costs Rise, CNBC (Jan. 24, 2018, 9:12 AM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/owners-of-mcdonalds-arent-happy-with-headquarters.html [https://
perma.cc/7XZK-SF3M] (discussing how McDonald’s is requiring franchisees to adopt a new
menu and equipment).
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priorities.144 Ultimately, this would use the charter to enact a form
of industrial policy, a controversial thing to do among economists
who trust laissez-faire and free markets more than dirigiste
direction from the state.145
Ricks has also focused on the charter; he thinks it should be
carefully policed to eliminate shadow banking (or at least any
government guarantee backing institutions providing bank-like
services without a bank charter).146 In his view, “entry restriction”
through charter protection is a critical component of well-done
financial regulation.147 As he has argued, “[F]inancial and macroeco-
nomic instability, monetary control, and private seigniorage....
supply a compelling justification for entry restriction.”148
In Ricks’s view, the control of the bank chartering process has
financial stability advantages because it establishes a clear gov-
ernment role over insured depository and loan-making institutions
and a clear delineation from other forms of financial intermediation
(which, if they involved the expansion of the monetary supply,
would not be permitted).149
The implication of Ricks’s theory of money creation could lead
to prohibitions of various sorts of shadow-banking ways to raise
144. Robert C. Hockett & Saulte T. Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for
a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437, 469-70 (2018).
145. See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 1,
2, 4, 6 (1997) (discussing the balance between free trade and industrial policy). Hockett and
Omarova know this, of course. They have argued, explicitly against laissez-faire economists,
that
[o]ur government is more than merely a market overseer and regulator—it is
also a direct market participant, acting not only to correct market failures or to
provide vital public goods but also to create, amplify, and guide private markets
in ways that enhance these markets’ potential to serve important long-term
public interests.
Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a
Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 105 (2015). Anna Gelpern and Erik
Gerding are less interested in the charter but view it as one of the mechanisms for the
government designation (and therefore the creation) of “safe” assets, underscoring the
importance of the government’s role vis a vis the private role. Anna Gelpern & Erik F.
Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 394 (2016).
146. See Morgan Ricks, Entry Restriction, Shadow Banking, and the Structure of Monetary
Institutions, 2 J. FIN. REG. 291, 292, 294-95 (2016).
147. Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 851.
148. Ricks, supra note 146, at 294; see also MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM:
RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 4-7 (2016).
149. Ricks, supra note 146, at 294.
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capital, including money market funds, securities lending busi-
nesses, and commercial paper—multibillion dollar businesses that
would be under regulatory threat. By the same token, the fintech
businesses that make loans—Amazon extending credit to vendors
on its site and other peer-to-peer lenders—would also be under
serious regulatory threat.
Others are much less sure. Acting Comptroller Noreika argued
instead that the chartering “narrative persists to keep commercial
interests from owning or having controlling interest in banks, in
part, because many view them as ‘public interests’ rather than the
‘private businesses’ they are.”150 In his view, banking is a business,
not a contract-out government function. In the wake of the financial
crisis, some academics have also questioned whether the licensing
requirements of the Agency rule out too many potentially beneficial
owners. Mehrsa Baradaran, for example, has made the case for
“possible alternatives to the strict separation of banking and
commerce, such as commercial ownership of traditional banks.”151
These scholars and policymakers find the insistence on the separa-
tion of banking and commerce to be inefficient, bad for consumers,
or both. And although the antiseparation crowd hails from across
the regulatory spectrum, they have much in common with libertar-
ian and free-market-oriented economists who have protested the
overlicensing of American commerce, a group we will discuss in
more detail in Part III.C.
B. The Chartering Debate Has Long Been with Us
The view that financial institutions are essentially providing a
public service and should be treated as quasi-arms of the gov-
ernment is controversial, though, as we have seen, fair game these
days. But treating bank charters as different and more precious
than corporate charters is a view that has plenty of historical and
contemporary support.152 The battle over whether to give out
150. Steven Harras, Acting OCC Chief Says Time to Revisit Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 2017 WL 5166575 (Nov. 8, 2017); see also Elizabeth J. Upton, Chartering Fintech:
The OCC’s Newest Nonbank Proposal, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1434 (2018) (reviewing
this debate).
151. Baradaran, supra note 109, at 389.
152. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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banking charters freely or parsimoniously today echoes a
nineteenth-century fight that only emphasizes how deep the worries
over new banks go.153
No less than the American Bankers Association has observed that
“[t]he seal of approval conferred by the OCC when it charters a
national bank is an important marker of trust to customers,”
suggesting that bankers, at least, think it is something special.154
Historically, that seal of approval has almost always been tightly
controlled.155 The first state banks were usually chartered by a
special bill of the legislature.156 The National Bank Act of 1864,
which created both a federal charter for banking, as well as the
OCC, reflected a theory of bank regulation premised on the im-
portance of a controlled charter, even though it would control the
federal charter less than some states controlled theirs.157
Loosening the constraints on access to bank charters has a long
pedigree as well, though. The question as to whether banks are
special, and should, therefore, be subject to special charter con-
straints, or whether they ought to be treated like other corporations
is not only being debated today. In the mid-nineteenth century there
was a great deal of attention paid to the promise of “free banking.”158
153. See infra Part V.D.
154. Comment Letter from Robert A. Morgan, Vice President, Emerging Techs., Am.
Bankers Ass’n, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3 (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.occ.
treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/comment-amer-bankers-assn.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y66R-EKHL].
155. See id. at 1, 3.
156. As Franklin Jones observed in 1926, “Most of the original thirteen colonies were
founded by commercial companies, which secured trade monopolies and concessions as to
taxes in their charters from the king.” Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law
of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 42, 42 (1926); see also Thomas C. Martin, Haunted by
History: Colonial Land Trusts Pose National Threat, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 303, 321 (2006)
(“With this vision of the economic potential of the Americas, King James granted charters to
various companies of investors, allowing them to colonize the Americas as financial
ventures.”).
157. The control was provided by regulators, as well as legislators. As Arthur Wilmarth has
put it, “The absence of any general provision in the National Bank Act authorizing national
banks to establish branches reflected Congress’ decentralized approach in the 1860s.” Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks,
77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 972 (1992). But the Comptroller then interpreted the congressional
lacuna to mean that national banks could not branch, limiting their size and risk—but also
their ability to grow. For a discussion, see Christian A. Johnson & Tara Rice, Assessing a
Decade of Interstate Bank Branching, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 79-80 (2008).
158. Solomon, supra note 83, at 62 (“Free banking, as previously noted, meant a system
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As Kenneth Scott has explained, many bank regulators and state
legislators thought that charters “should be readily available to
anyone who complied with relatively simple and specific statutory
requirements, rather than be grants of special privilege by the
legislature.”159 New York and Michigan passed free-banking laws in
the 1830s, and by the 1860s, half of the states had adopted similar
policies.160 Free banking was designed to facilitate credit access in
a time when banks were viewed with suspicion and desire to create
competition in the sector was strong. It allowed—at least in
theory—states to develop a close-to-home financing channel that
could be regulated with branch restrictions, capital ratios, and
interest rate oversight.161 At the same time, the free banking era
featured unstable banks and wildcat start-ups that have led some
to conclude that the era was a financially chaotic one.162
Charter expansionists, such as Noreika and Baradaran, and pro-
ponents of free banking are roughly on the same side of an age-old
debate—they want more banking services offered by more people,
to more people, on the assumption that doing so will lower costs and
increase efficiency.163 Traditionalists are more likely to take the
perspective of those who believe that the charter must be zealously
guarded either for reasons of financial stability, or because the
finance franchise is a valuable government program that should
condition participation on the provision of various public-spirited
goods.164
C. Bank Charters as an Overlicensing Case Study
If history shows that restrictive banking licenses have long
been a part of banking, one might take the free banking critique
further. Licensing is ubiquitous in the federal administrative state
and has come under criticism for being overly burdensome and
that eliminated the need to obtain a special charter from a state government to organize a
bank.”).
159. Scott, supra note 33, at 239.
160. Id.
161. See Solomon, supra note 83, at 61-62.
162. See id. at 62.
163. See supra notes 150-51.
164. See supra Part III.A.
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understudied.165 As Richard Epstein has observed, despite being the
“focal point of enormous public discontent, [licensing (or permit-
ting)] has received scant attention in the academic literature.”166
One way to take the measure of licensing is to look at financial
regulation, where no institution can operate as a bank without first
obtaining government preapproval.167 J.B. Ruhl and Eric Biber
describe such a regime as an “extreme specific permit[ting]” regime,
the sort of permitting most susceptible to administrative abuse.168
But banking regulation has always had a chartering component
accepted by both liberal skeptics of state capture and by conserva-
tive free market economists.169 The banking charter offers a test of
the case for and against licensing more generally.
The ideas of special charters and special responsibilities for
businesses are often unconvincing in many contexts. It is one thing
if a business is engaged in particularly dangerous activities; then
professional licenses make sense.170 Licenses might also make sense
for professions where public service is a component of the job—doc-
tors, with their public health mission, and lawyers, with their
responsibility to serve as officers of the court, might be examples of
this.171 And, some sort of mechanism of professional discipline
probably must exist if an industry is required to put the interests of
its clients ahead of its own, as is the case for investment advisors
165. See John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix Occupational
Licensing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 844, 847-48 (2017) (“While libertarians have challenged licensing
laws for years, political progressives (including the Obama administration) are joining the
calls for reform.”).
166. Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407,
407 (1995).
167. See Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 140 (2014).
168. Id. at 140, 158.
169. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 888 (2015); John H. Cochrane, Challenges for
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S63, S71 (2014).
170. Even the night-watchman state advocate Philip Hamburger admits this. “The
government could even (within its enumerated powers) license dangerous activities, as it does
with the distribution and development of pharmaceuticals.” Philip Hamburger, The New
Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 312-13.
171. Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers, 42 J. CORP. L. 559, 562-63
(2017).
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and other sorts of professionals who put their licenses at risk if they
betray their clients.172
But financial firms occupy an uneasy place in this set of concerns
and that part of the case for licensing fits well with this worry. It is
true that financial firms are dangerous.173 Runnable financial firms
count as risky, with the prospect of contagion. However, they are not
exactly fiduciaries, especially when they are making markets, sell-
ing financial products, or even making plain vanilla commercial
loans.
More generally, licensing has become a source of real controversy,
especially as, at the state and local level, it has expanded beyond
the professions to the trades, where a straightforward story about
economic protectionism and rent-seeking can be told. Louisiana has
tried to shut down some monks who dared to sell funeral caskets
without a license.174 Utah has required hair-braiders to obtain
cosmetology licenses, meaning, as one judge put it, that a hair-
braider “cannot legally braid hair for money unless she spends
thousands of dollars for hundreds of hours of classes that have
nothing to do with her occupation of natural braiding.”175 There
has been litigation over the District of Columbia’s tour guide li-
censing.176 The literature is openly skeptical that this sort of
licensing is doing much good, and there is no shortage of other
outlandish examples at which to point.177
172. See id.
173. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
174. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217-18 (5th Cir. 2013) (refusing to
enforce the requirement against the monks on rational basis review).
175. Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (D. Utah 2012) (holding the
requirement as unconstitutional for being unrelated to a rational government interest).
176. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding the
requirement to be a free speech violation). As the D.C. Circuit put it, “In Washington, D.C.,
it is illegal to talk about points of interest or the history of the city while escorting or guiding
a person who paid you to do so—that is, unless you pay the government $200 and pass a 100-
question multiple-choice exam.” Id. For a discussion, see Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner,
2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 152.
177. See, e.g., MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 20-21 (2006); Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another
Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1100-
01 (2014) (arguing for “stopping cartel-like abuses of antitrust immunity” by subjecting
licensing boards to constrained antitrust).
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All of this has motivated free-market types to take an especially
close look at licensing—it is regulation, after all, and a heavy-
handed sort at that, creating barriers to entry. Reputable econo-
mists dating back to Milton Friedman have argued that there ought
to be no licensing at all—that surgeons should not be required by
the government to attend medical school, that scuba divers should
not be certified, and so on.178
And the case against licensing can go even further. Doing some-
thing about licensing abuses might not only lead to less-regulated
markets, it might also give courts a greater role in policing the sub-
stance of economic regulations, a role they have stayed out of since
the era of Lochner v. New York came to a close.179 Libertarians
confident in the wisdom of judges might want to bring back Lochner-
style scrutiny to the regulatory state.
In this way, the long-accepted licensing requirements of banking
offer something of a test case for the claims of over licensing that
have marked other, different areas of regulation. If the banking
licensing regime looks problematic, then the case for licensing may
be as bad as Friedman thought it was. In banking, where licensing
has generally been accepted as appropriate, there is some indication
of a desire for somewhat less rigor, at least when it comes to
ownership, and, as we will see in Part V (the fintech Part) of this
Article, perhaps also in business models as well.180 Nonetheless, as
we will see in the next Part, the chartering regime in banking does
178. A particular opposition to medical licenses animated Milton Friedman. MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 35, 37, 158 (1962) (listing “some activities currently
undertaken by government in the U.S., that cannot, so far as I can see, validly be justified”
including “[l]icensure provisions in various cities and states which restrict particular
enterprises or occupations or professions to people who have a license,” meaning that, inter
alia, “licensure should be eliminated as a requirement for the practice of medicine”); see also
Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Regulation of Charlatans in High-Skill Pro-
fessions 38 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 17-43, 2019), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2979134 [https://perma.cc/68T2-7H5C] (arguing that licensing for doctors,
lawyers, and financial professionals increases costs); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Dubious Case for
Professional Licensing, ECONOMIX (Oct. 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.
com/2013/10/11/the-dubious-case-for-professional-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/RJM7-85U9].
179. 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905); see also Joseph Sanderson, Don’t Bury the Competition: The
Growth of Occupational Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 457
(2014) (describing the prospect of judicial review of protectionist licensing as “a return to
Lochner-esque intensive judicial review of economic regulation”).
180. See infra Part V.A.
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not look like regulation unmoored from the values that Congress
created for the regime. The chartering decisions made by the OCC
are technocratic, if not particularly well-explained. Concerns, if any,
arise from the intensity of the nonpublic parts of the review of
charter applications, and the corresponding difficulties in obtaining
a charter.
IV. FEDERAL CHARTERING IN PRACTICE
This Part of the Article reviews how the OCC comes by and
exercises its charter authority in practice. It is based on a review of
all the charter denials by the Agency since 2003, no particularly
difficult task given that there are so few. Although what goes into
a denial is the most interesting way to analyze OCC’s charter
parsimony, the charter grant orders were reviewed as well, as were
the Agency’s applications, materials, and guidances. Lawyers who
had successfully applied for charters were also interviewed, as were
regulators.
In practice, the OCC makes obtaining a charter costly by insisting
on a searching application process, and by discouraging marginal
cases from proceeding.181 However, once that process is concluded,
it almost never denies charter applications and has made noises
about trying hard to grant them.182 This practice indicates that the
charter is not an instrument of government control—at least, not
because of the charter decision itself, which is given or not given
based on the facts of the application rather than on the potential of
the future activities of the bank and its competitors. Deposit
insurance applications submitted with the charter application
underscore the point—the FDIC does not make deposit insurance
easy to get, but it never interacts with national banks seeking
181. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 4-5; see also
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS 3 (July 2018)
[hereinafter OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT], https://
www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B6PA-BD52].
182. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 181,
at 1, 3.
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insurance ever again after doling the insurance policy out.183 The
OCC’s ordinary supervision of an existing bank is without question
rigorous, and can be used to send banks toward particular causes
and to keep them out of certain businesses.184 But there is little
indication that any of this is related to the chartering decision itself.
A. The Practice of Chartering
The odd result of the OCC’s searching charter application re-
quirements is that, while navigating the OCC’s approval process is
no easy thing, the Agency rarely denies applications for bank
charters.
When it denies applications, the denials come in short letters with
little reference to the law and somewhat routine conclusions.185
Charter approvals look quite similar to rejections—two- to five- page
letters, generally, reciting a rote set of facts, the occasional legal
reference, and an indication that the application has been approved
or denied.186 If anything, charter approvals and merger approvals
are more elaborate than the denials, as the Agency often describes
the proposed business in detail and outlines some conditions for
approval, where appropriate.187 Nonetheless, even with grants, the
discussion section of approval letters is sometimes only a paragraph
long.188
183. See, e.g., FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, DEPOSIT INSURANCE
APPLICATIONS: PROCEDURES MANUAL 11-12 (Oct. 2018), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
applications/depositinsurance/procmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/64NA-NFLF]. Unless the
bank is subject to resolution (the term for bankruptcy), of course. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 2 (Jan. 2019), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BMN-HW82] (discussing
the resolution process).
184. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2013-29, THIRD-
PARTY RELATIONSHIPS: RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE 3-4 (Oct. 2013), https://www.occ.gov/
news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html [https://perma.cc/5K58-CHKG].
185. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION NO.
2004-4 1 (Feb. 2004), https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-
actions/2004/cd04-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SDZ-B59F].
186. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION NO.
2015-02 1-2 (Mar. 2015), https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-
and-actions/2015/cd15-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXP2-WHXA].
187. See id. at 2.
188. See, e.g., id. at 1-2 (showing a discussion section that amounts to one paragraph plus
one sentence, and 160 words, in approving charter conversion).
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1. Illustrating the Approval Process: The Online-Only Bank
The OCC divides its charter applicants into two groups. De novo
applications are for start-up banks, while charter conversion
applications seek to change state-chartered banks, state- or fed-
erally chartered thrifts, or credit unions into nationally chartered
banks.189 The lawyers who represent clients approved for national
charters are often sophisticated, including experienced practitioners
from the financial regulatory groups of the highly profitable and
well-known New York firms of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and
Sullivan & Cromwell.190 Because these firms are expensive, and
would be unlikely to be hired for easily obtainable licenses, their
presence in the application process suggests that navigating charter
approvals at the federal level is complex, that bank charters are
valuable, or both.
One way to make sense of how the Agency handles these sorts of
applications is to investigate an illustrative charter application in
some detail. The highest profile recent de novo application also
helps to illustrate one way that fintech is finding its way into the
banking space. Varo Money is an online-only lender that may serve
as an example of how de novo charters are sought, as well as an
example of a fintech shadow bank that hopes to come out of the
shadows.
Varo’s business model, as the bank put it in a press release, is to
be the “first national bank in American history designed for people
who want to bank on their smart phones.”191 The firm seeks to
provide a full panoply of banking services to customers comfortable
with banking without ever visiting a bank branch; it has already
189. See OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL:
CONVERSIONS TO FEDERAL CHARTER 1 (2019), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-
resources/publications/comptrollers-licensing-manual/files/conversi.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XBD4-PKN2]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 1.
190. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Wachtell, Sullivan & Cromwell Lead on BB&T, SunTrust
Deal, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2019, 1:44 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-law/
wachtell-sullivan-cromwell-lead-on-bb-t-suntrust-deal [https://perma.cc/E52W-5VSF].
191. Connor McSheffrey, Varo Bank, N.A. Applies for National Bank Charter, VARO MONEY
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.varomoney.com/press_release/varo-bank-n-applies-national-
bank-charter/ [https://perma.cc/53DA-UG48].
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built up a customer base by partnering with a duly chartered bank
through which it can route deposits.192
Varo is a start-up supported by private equity—former Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner’s firm, Warburg Pincus, has led the
fundraising for it.193 Varo’s second financing round, in which it
raised forty-five million of the seventy-eight million dollars in
capital it had obtained at the point in which it applied for the
banking charter, was premised on the pending application by the
bank for a national bank charter, as it noted in its announcement
closing the financing round.194 As Colin Walsh, the CEO of the
company, has said,
[T]he foundational banking products that we offer are the
checking account, the interest bearing savings account, a form
of short term sort of revolving credit and installment loans and
those make up kind of the core of the banking products.
...
[B]ecause we’re in a mobile platform, we don’t own branches, we
have a partnership on our ATM networks as opposed to having
our own ATMs, we don’t do expensive cash handling, we don’t
have legacy technology; we’re able to offer our products at very
low cost.195
But Varo has suggested that a charter offers the promise of
potential expansion abroad and at home, as well as regulatory
simplicity.196 As Varo’s CEO has put it, without a charter, Varo was
“having deposits sitting with a sponsor bank and having lending
through a series of state lending licenses,” effectively giving the
192. Katie Roof, Varo Money Raises $45 Million from Mobile Banking Without Fees,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:47 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/18/varo-money-raises-
45-million-for-mobile-banking-without-fees/ [https://perma.cc/R5H4-Z8RV] (“Varo offers an
FDIC-backed bank account backed by The Bancorp Bank.”).
193. Telis Demos, Silicon Valley Looks at Something New: Starting a Bank, WALL ST. J.
(May 1, 2016, 7:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-looks-at-something-new-
starting-a-bank-1462146047 [https://perma.cc/MB56-9YW2] (describing Varo Money’s model).
194. Varo Money Closes $45 Million Series B Financing Round, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 18, 2018,
9:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180118005410/en/Varo-Money-Closes-
45M-Series-Financing [https://perma.cc/M73Z-DASU].
195. Lend Academy Podcast: Episode No. 142, LEND ACADEMY 2-3 (Mar. 9, 2018), https://
www.lendacademy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Podcast-142-Colin-Walsh.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3RFQ-WB6L].
196. See id. at 6.
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company twenty-one regulators.197 If the OCC gives a final approv-
al of its charter application, it will probably only have one—the
national charter preempts most state consumer protection laws and
all money transmitter requirements and usury limits.198
Obtaining a charter for Varo has proven to be a lengthy process,
and, at the time of writing, it is still ongoing. The prefiling contact
with the Agency began in 2017 with an application for a provisional
charter filed on July 21, 2017.199
The application process for a national charter, which requires
approval from both the OCC (for the charter) and FDIC (for the
deposit insurance the bank must obtain if it is to take deposits), has
been described by Varo’s officers as a “high hurdle” that “is incredi-
bly demanding and complicated,” because of the novelty of the
business model.200 “The OCC is not going to relax their standards,
so it’s been a rigorous process. They’re definitely not just sitting on
it. We speak regularly,” Varo’s Walsh told the American Banker in
January of 2018.201
No online-only banks had received charter approval from the
OCC or FDIC before Varo.202 In fact, the most high-profile, recent
effort by an Internet firm to obtain such a charter, by the peer-to-
197. Id.
198. See infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
199. See McSheffrey, supra note 191.
200. Lalita Clozel, Mobile-Only Fintech Makes Play for (Regular) Bank Charter, AM.
BANKER (July 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/mobile-only-fintech-
makes-play-for-regular-bank-charter [https://perma.cc/7RFA-RUME] (“[I]t remains to be seen
whether regulators—particularly the FDIC, which has granted deposit insurance to just a
trickle of new banks since the crisis—are ready for a mobile-only bank.”).
201. Penny Crosman, Mission-Driven Varo Money Secures $45 Million from Investors, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/mission-driven-
varo-money-secures-45-million-from-investors [https://perma.cc/8KJ6-ZQSB] (“[C]harter
would give Varo the ability to offer deposits and thereby gain low-cost funds, and it would
enable it to report to one regulator rather than myriad state and national agencies.”). Varo
recently received approval for deposit insurance with the FDIC, leaving final approval from
the OCC as its final hurdle. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ORDER RE: VARO BANK, NA (Feb. 7,
2020), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/depins/varo-bank-na-draper-
utah.pdf [https://perma.cc/97RX-DB5P].
202. See Anna Irrera, SoFi Withdraws U.S. Banking Application, Citing Leadership
Change, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sofi-future/sofi-
withdraws-u-s-banking-application-citing-leadership-change-idUSKBN1CI2XC [https://perma.
cc/GTH6-XV82].
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peer lender SoFi, concluded with a withdrawn application after its
CEO resigned in a sexual harassment scandal.203
Varo’s application for a national charter was filed by Sullivan &
Cromwell, a well-known New York law firm with plenty of banking
expertise, on July 21, 2017.204 The eighty-eight-page application,
including exhibits, with an even larger confidential appendix at-
tached (but not released to the public), follows a template consisting
of responses to a series of questions set forth on an OCC form.205 The
questions range from the fundamental to the obscure, from how the
bank expects to obtain sufficient capital to whether the bank’s
physical manifestations would be handicap accessible or would be
located in historically significant buildings (in the case of Varo—a
mobile-only bank that would have only a headquarters in Salt Lake
City and a business office in San Francisco—the requirements
would only apply to its headquarters and business offices).206
All told, the form application included twenty-five pages of re-
sponses to preset OCC inquiries with seven of those pages being
devoted to the largest single response category, the management
and ownership of the bank.207
Attached with the application were a number of public exhibits
including the bank’s bylaws, its plan to comply with the Community
Reinvestment Act, and other forms of paperwork.208 A larger set of
confidential exhibits listed Varo’s shareholders, its business plan,
its management policies, and its prefiling financial statements—
Varo began its application with two pages making the case for the
confidential treatment of this information.209
203. See id. (“[The CEO’s] departure in September had complicated SoFi’s banking
application, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters earlier this month, because
regulators assess whether a company has a capable CEO before allowing it to accept
deposits.”).
204. See Varo Bank, N.A.: Interagency Charter and Federal Deposit Insurance Application
1 (July 21, 2017), https://foia-pal.occ.gov/App/ReadingRoom.aspx [https://perma.cc/79N2-L6J4]
(search for “Varo” in the “Folder Name” search box).
205. See generally id.
206. See id. at 22, 27.
207. See id. at 5-29.
208. See id. at 36-82.
209. As Varo said in its application, “Disclosure of this information would reveal to
competitors the internal strategies, future plans and competitive position of the Applicant and
would place the Applicant at a competitive disadvantage with respect to their competitors who
do not publicly reveal such information.” Id. at 1-3.
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After receiving the submission, the OCC published the
nonconfidential components of the application and the fact that the
filing had been made and invited comments for a thirty-day period.
Varo got a positive comment from a Salt Lake City resident and a
nine-page-long negative comment from the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition, speculating that the bank would not meet
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) priorities.210 Despite the
concerns that regulators and potential competitors have expressed
with fintechs receiving bank charters, no comments were received
from either regulators or competitors (partly this may be explained
by the fact that Varo is seeking a standard national bank charter,
rather than the special purpose charter that state regulators have
argued is beyond the power of the OCC to offer).
Varo may have decided to apply when it did on the basis of a
speech by the OCC’s acting comptroller encouraging fintechs to
apply for national bank charters.211 The decision to apply was wise
as to one regulator and unfortunate as to another. Varo received
conditional approval from the OCC in a five-page letter that
addressed, but ultimately dismissed, the comments that the bank
would fail to meet its CRA obligations.212 “The Bank has demon-
strated in its charter application and through discussions with OCC
staff that it understands the requirements of the CRA and has
begun to develop a CRA plan,” the Agency observed.213
As is usual for grant letters, the references to legal authority were
limited; but the OCC imposed conditions on Varo, most significant-
ly that Varo would be required to raise $104 million in capital to
obtain final approval for the charter, but also that it enter into an
210. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CONDITIONAL APPROVAL NO. 1205
2 (Sept. 2018), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-
actions/2018/ca1205.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W5H-8MET].
211. See OCC Invitation Prompts Fintech to Apply for Traditional Bank Charter, WESTLAKE
LEGAL, http://www.lawyerinloudoun.com/occ-invitation-prompts-fintech-to-apply-for-
traditional-bank-charter/ [https://perma.cc/MD7F-WEK2] (“Varo instead opted to apply for
the traditional national bank charter through the OCC and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp.—a step some attorneys view as a direct result of the OCC acting comptroller’s July 19
speech to the Exchequer Club in Washington, D.C., that encouraged fintechs to act as
banks.”).
212. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 210, at 1-2.
213. Id. at 2.
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operating agreement with the Agency and obtain approval for the
addition of any principals to the leadership of the bank.214
The conditional approval was dramatic—the OCC has engaged in
so little postcrisis chartering. However, Varo was unable to obtain
deposit insurance from the FDIC until February 7, 2020.215
Varo does not yet have final approval from OCC, though it is
likely to get it, and accordingly remains unlicensed and dependant
on its correspondent bank for banking services pending its passage
of its final hurdle.216
2. Charter Denials
A review of every charter denial by the Agency between 2003 and
2017 is a straightforward recounting of the application of a fit and
proper standard, but with teeth, to would-be bankers who appear to
be inexperienced, criminal, or some combination of both. This de-
scribes the entirety of the Agency’s denial oeuvre.
The OCC does not make overt policy choices with its denials,
regarding, say, an oversupply of banking or the failure to serve a
needed growth industry seeking funding, but rather objects to the
experience or quality of the team behind the application or the
prospects of the bank’s business plan.217 For example, it told one
would-be California bank that it denied the bank’s charter applica-
tion because of a “lack of banking experience on the proposed board
of directors” and because “the two most senior members of the
management team do not meet our standards for approval of the
charter application.”218 It told another that the management team
was not “sufficiently strong,” which warranted rejection of the
214. See id. at 3-4.
215. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 201.
216. Bill Streeter, Varo Money Launching First True Mobile-Only National Bank, FIN.
BRAND (Sept. 4, 2019), https://thefinancialbrand.com/87849/fintech-varo-money-mobile-
national-bank-charter-challenger-neobank/ [https://perma.cc/R6ZU-929N]; see also OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION 2003-8
1-2 (July 2003), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-
actions/2003/cd03-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H9W-X6VC] (“[W]e concluded that the management
team was not sufficiently strong because the members lacked demonstrated and relevant
experience.”).
218. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 185, at 2.
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charter application.219 Sometimes it does not explain the reasons for
its denial.220
Underlying these sorts of objections is often a sense that the
applicants are naïve, or, possibly, up to no good. In a South Dakota
case, the Agency objected to the proposal by an acquiring bank to
transition into a subprime credit card business.221 As the OCC
explained, the “proposed business plan for the Bank to become an
issuer of general purpose credit cards represents not only a
significant change to the Bank’s previous business, but also a shift
to an intensely competitive segment of the credit card market, in
which the Bank ... [has] no discernable experience.”222 When ExTran
Bank sought a federal charter in Florida, the OCC rejected the
application in perhaps its longest denial letter, amounting to 1666
words, or three and a half pages,223 because it believed that “the
nature of the proposed activities ... pos[ed] particularly high
supervisory and regulatory risks, including risks surrounding [the]
Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering.”224 Moreover, “the
application ... provided no explanation or justification to demon-
strate that the proposed level of staffing of the compliance depart-
ment would be sufficient given the high supervisory and regulatory
risks raised by the application.”225 The Agency apparently had
doubts that ExTran would have had the capability, or even the
desire, to catch illegal activity inside the bank.226
219. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 217, at 2-3.
220. This appears to be the case with the proposed Western Development Bank of Fresno,
whose denial was published in a chart in 2004, and nowhere else that I could find. See Julie
L. Williams, Corporate Structure of National Banking System, 24 OFF. COMPTROLLER
CURRENCY Q.J. 1, 100 (2005); see also Details for OCC Control Number: 2004-WE-01-004, OFF.
COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://apps.occ.gov/CAAS_CATS/CAAS_Details.aspx?FilingTypeID
=2&FilingID=93318&FilingSubtypeID=1101 [https://perma.cc/S2BP-TKBQ].
221. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION NO. 2003-
11 3-4 (Oct. 2003), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-
and-actions/2003/cd03-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V9C-6ZKL].
222. Id. at 3.
223. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION
NO. 2008-10 (Dec. 2008), https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-
and-actions/2008/cd08-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD86-P4KZ].
224. Id. at 1 (quoting Letter from Lawrence E. Beard, Deputy Comptroller, Licensing, to
Herbert D. Haughton, Drafter of ExTran’s charter application (Mar. 31, 2008)).
225. Id. at 2.
226. See id. at 3.
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B. All Applications Analysis
Between 2003, the year during which the OCC first indicated its
willingness to consider special purpose charters, and 2010, the OCC
received 236 new charter applications and approved or conditionally
approved 190 of those applicants.227 From 2011 to 2017, charter
applications declined dramatically—less than ten were received for
those six years.228 For applications for charters between 2003 and
2017, only four were denied, and three of those denials were in 2003
and 2004.229 In sum, so-called “de novo” charter applications, for
banks starting from scratch, all but disappeared, as Figure 1 below
indicates (as we have observed, they have begun to rebuild steam in
2018-2019, after the period of study here).230 The difference is
apparent to the eye; moreover, the difference in means between
2005-2008 (roughly before and during the financial crisis) and 2009-
2012 (during and after the financial crisis) are statistically signifi-
cant at the p<.05 level for de novo charter applications received and
for conditional approvals of conditional charter applications.231
227. See infra fig.1.
228. See infra fig.1.
229. See infra fig.1.
230. The sources for Figure 1 are OCC’s annual reports. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORTS, https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/
publications/annual-report/index-annual-report.html [https://perma.cc/5CSY-6Z3J] (click on
each report to view the data used to compile Figure 1).
231. The means for the four-year periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 are also significantly
different for charter approvals plus conditional approvals at the p<.05 level. Differences in
means were calculated using Welch’s two-sample t-test, which is appropriate where the
samples have unequal variances (as is the case for several variables here) and which performs
comparably to the Student’s t-test otherwise. See Welch T-Test, STATISTICAL TOOLS FOR HIGH-
THROUGHPUT DATA ANALYSIS, http://www.sthda.com/english/wiki/welch-t-test [https://perma.
cc/K4BN-QFVZ].
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Figure 1.
Nor has the situation been alleviated by charter conversions, or
applications to turn state or federal non-OCC banking licenses into
OCC licenses. Charter conversions also show a decline since the fi-
nancial crisis, as Figure 2 below establishes, though the difference
between precrisis applications or approvals and postcrisis appli-
cations or approvals is not statistically significant.232
232. The sources for Figure 2 are the OCC’s annual reports. See supra note 231. Again,
Welch’s two-sample t-test was employed to see if the means between 2005-2008 and 2009-
2012 were significantly different. It is unsurprising that they were not, as most conversions
are accompanied by a merger, and in the wake of the crisis, regulators often encouraged
troubled, but not failing, banks to find a healthier strategic partner. Marcelo Rezende, The
Effects of Bank Charter Switching on Supervisory Ratings 14 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working
Paper No. 2014-20, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2014/201420/201420pap.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AP7X-B6TG]; Mike McIntire, Bailout Is a Windfall to Banks, If Not to
Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/business/18bank.
html [https://perma.cc/YCD9-WAWG]. Moreover the samples were small (though this makes
the significant difference between the precrisis and postcrisis means for de novo applications
all the more surprising). Compare supra fig.1, with infra fig.2.
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Figure 2.
The comparative vibrancy of charter conversions is probably re-
lated to the disappearance of de novo applications for charters;233
because many banks struggled through the financial crisis, existing
charters for cheap, small, and all-but-shell banks are available for
conversion at an inexpensive rate.
The paucity of new entrants into the banking system prompted
the 2017 approval of a national charter for a de novo bank to be
greeted with hosannas from the Acting Comptroller himself, who
pronounced himself “encouraged that we are seeing increasing
interest in becoming new banks and that de novo activity appears
to be thawing slowly as the economy warms.”234 The Acting Comp-
troller welcomed the bank—a relatively small institution based in
Winter Park, Florida—to national supervision, but cautioned that
“de novo banks are still exceedingly rare.”235 He recommended
233. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
234. First National Bank Charter Granted Since Financial Crisis, FED. BANKING L. REP.
NO. 2744, Nov. 7, 2017, at 5 (quoting Keith Noreika).
235. Id. (quoting Keith Noreika). Since then, a small bank headquartered in Hollywood,
Florida, has also won conditional approval to hold a national charter—a development that
suggests that the OCC is still acting parsimoniously when it comes to de novo applications.
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deregulation: “Making the process of establishing de novo banks
more efficient can only accelerate the recent positive trend and
create more economic opportunity for consumers, businesses, and
communities across the nation.”236
The secret halt in the chartering of new lending institutions is
not unique to the OCC. The FDIC also ceased entertaining appli-
cations from two different kinds of banks during the same period.
First, it ceased approving applications from de novo industrial loan
companies (ILCs) in 2008 and glanced a relatively skeptical eye on
those applications from 2000 to 2007.237 ILCs are lending institu-
tions owned by commercial firms and mostly chartered by the state
of Utah—a rare breach in the wall separating banks from commer-
cial activities, but a relatively modest one in size.238
Second, between 2000 and 2007, the years leading up to the
financial crisis, the FDIC received more than 1600 de novo charter
applications for deposit insurance and granted approximately 75
percent of the applications.239 But the crisis meant that applications,
and grants, ground to a halt. Between January 2011 and July 2016,
the FDIC received only ten applications for deposit insurance for de
novo institutions, of which it approved three (all of which were from
state-charted institutions).240 The FDIC’s caution won it the ire of
former Acting Comptroller Noreika, who said that it was holding up
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CONDITIONAL APPROVAL NO. 1197 1 (July
2018), https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2018/ca11
97.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y53M-TA4H].
236. First National Bank Charter Granted Since Financial Crisis, supra note 234, at 5.
237. See The Reemergence of De Novo Bank Charters, ARNOLD & PORTER (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/10/the-reemergence-of-de-
novo-bank-charters [https://perma.cc/9VUS-YK7S].
238. As Aaron Klein has explained, “While the FDIC between 2000 and 2008 approved 28
new ILCs, none have been approved since then. Between 2011 and 2016 there were no
applications to the FDIC to create new ILCs.” Aaron Klein, FinTechs, Lending and Banking:
Can All Three Co-Exist? 20 No. 5 FINTECH L. REP. NL 1 (Sept./Oct. 2017). This unsurprisingly
makes the ILC an unattractive—or possibly unavailable—option for new entrants such as
fintech firms. Cinar Oney, Fintech Industrial Banks and Beyond: How Banking Innovations
Affect the Federal Safety Net, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 541, 544 (2018) (“[T]he industrial
bank charter is not the only option for the FinTech firms that seek to engage in the business
of banking.”).
239. Oversight of the FDIC Application Process: Hearing Before the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, 114th Cong. 10 (2016) (statement of Martin J. Gruenberg,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
240. See id. at 12.
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a process in cases where the OCC was willing to charter banks.241
In 2017, he complained, “We, ourselves, since 2001 have charter-
ed 14 institutions, and the FDIC hasn’t acted on a single—any of
those 14 applications .... They just let it hang out there forever, so
that the organizers wasted all their money trying to get insurance,
and then they gave up.”242
In this way, Noreika suggested that the OCC, or at least he, was
still a friend to the start-up bank community. But whatever its
views of the FDIC, in all, the practice of the Agency indicates that
it is certainly not doing what the charter reformers would like it to
do.243 The Agency spends no time evaluating the public interest in
a new bank or nudging a bank towards policy priorities of the
government.244 Instead, it takes the measure of the management
team, using a complex application and an ultimately low bar, and
grants those applications that have managed their way through the
process and met that bar.245
The OCC’s searching application decisions have created some
problems for its bottom line. Start-up banks have a choice of
government agencies to turn to when they make their de novo
applications.246 State banks, assuming they can obtain FDIC deposit
insurance, offer most of the features that national banks do,
meaning that the OCC must balance its skepticism of business
models against its desire for the examination fees that any new
member of its system would provide.247 Moreover, state charter
holders have found that they are generally able to access the
broader national market when it comes to obtaining clients and
241. Rob Tricchinelli, OCC’s Noreika Knocks FDIC Pace on New Bank Charters,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 4, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20170807183913/https://www.
bna.com/occs-noreika-knocks-n73014462803/ [https://perma.cc/TZ5S-X48C].
242. Id. (quoting Noreika). It means that these firms got provisionally approved by the
OCC, assuming they could obtain deposit insurance; when they could not, those applications
were withdrawn. See id.
243. See Hilary Burns, Will De Novo Activity Pick Up in 2019? Don’t Bet on It, AM. BANKER
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-de-novo-activity-pick-up-in-2019-
think-again [https://perma.cc/H32C-QJDC].
244. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 3-6.
245. See id.
246. See Christine E. Blair & Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Banking System:
The Funding of Bank Supervision, 18 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 1 (2006).
247. See id. at 3, 18.
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depositors,248 meaning that what the OCC offers them amounts to
either high-quality supervision or low-touch regulation.249 OCC
examination fees tend to be higher than state fees, meaning that
state charters usually have a cost advantage.250 Perhaps for this
reason, since 2003, most bank start-ups have obtained state
charters, which has led to outright worry by the OCC, as the Agency
depends upon examination fees to fund its budget.251
C. What Should Be Done?
As we have observed, the OCC’s practice when it comes to char-
tering banks has been extraordinarily secretive. For most of the
past decade, it has refused to charter any banks; for the decade
before that, it chartered many.252 The change in policy has been
unannounced and unexplained.253 Nor has the FDIC done anything
public to suggest that it is no longer willing to grant deposit
insurance to start-up banks, although that appears to be its
practice.254 Moving from a licensing regime to a no-license-is-
permitted regime without any sort of transparency about the
248. For example, “[p]rior to 1980, state-chartered banks were not able to export interest
rates across state lines like their nationally chartered competitors. Concerns about com-
petitive equity caused Congress to provide state banks with equal powers.” Brian Knight, Why
State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, AM. BANKER (Sep. 6, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://
www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-state-by-state-fintech-oversight-doesnt-work
[https://perma.cc/5RE5-PJQ3].
249. For a discussion, see David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187,
209 (2010) (reviewing the closeness of the relationship between banks and their regulators,
which means, among other things, that banks rarely sue under the APA, for fear that the
regulators will retaliate).
250. As two FDIC economists have put it, “[T]he assessments for supervision paid by state-
chartered banks are significantly less than those paid by comparably sized OCC-supervised
banks.” Blair & Kushmeider, supra note 246, at 6; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2018-43, FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: CALENDAR YEAR 2019 FEES
AND ASSESSMENTS STRUCTURE (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulle
tins/2018/bulletin-2018-43.html# [https://perma.cc/CA35-WERT].
251. Gary W. Whalen, Why Do De Novo Banks Choose a National Charter? 2 fig.1, 5-7 (OCC
Econ., Working Paper No. 2010-2, 2010), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-
by-type/occ-working-papers/2012-2009/wp2010-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X4T-S8PG].
252. Supra fig.1.
253. See supra Part IV.A.2.
254. See Tricchinelli, supra note 241 (quoting Noreika).
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decision and why it has been made looks like entirely arbitrary
administrative law.255
Moreover, the solution is not particularly difficult. The OCC could
issue a guidance document indicating that it would treat new
applications for new banks in the wake of a financial crisis or
troubled economy with “enhanced scrutiny.” That guidance would
put regulated industry on notice without going through the
complexities of rulemaking required by the APA.256 In 2018, it, or
the FDIC, could have announced that a new approach to de novo
applications was being taken.257 That it has chosen not to announce
its new chartering policies, except perhaps obliquely in speeches, so
suggests that the Agency feels particularly unencumbered by the
regulatory requirements that most of its peer agencies must
honor.258 It is secret law, and secret law is bad law.259 The OCC
should publicize and update its willingness to consider charter
applications.
V. THE FINTECH CHARTER
The conservative practice of the OCC when it comes to chartering
actual banks has changed—maybe—with its new willingness to
charter certain businesses that rely on the Internet to provide fi-
nancial services to their customers.260 The so-called fintech charter
would expand the reach of both the Agency and the reach of the
bank charter—a different practice from the OCC’s recent unwill-
ingness to expand the number of chartered banks at all.261 The pro-
posed fintech charter has occasioned consternation and lawsuits,
but the concern is, while not unreasonable, largely misplaced.
255. See supra Parts IV.A.2-3.
256. See MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS:
AN OVERVIEW 5-6 (2013) (discussing the rulemaking process).
257. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
258. See Zaring, supra note 249, at 200.
259. “The law cannot be a secret hidden from the public.” Jonathan Manes, Secret Law, 106
GEO. L.J. 803, 805 (2018).
260. For some examples of businesses that rely on the Internet to provide financial
services, see Farrington, supra note 120 (discussing companies that provide debt services);
Sraders, supra note 121 (discussing Venmo and PayPal).
261. See supra fig.1.
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After situating the state of play in the fintech marketplace, and
in the existing regulation of it, I examine the Agency’s practice
when it comes to special charters. I then evaluate the costs and
benefits of a fintech charter. With the preemption of state banking
and usury laws, national charters offer the promise of a single
regulator and the possibility of a technically superior, if more ex-
pensive, form of supervision. So far, the OCC has treaded extreme-
ly cautiously when it comes to fintech, and my normative conclusion
is that this is appropriate and should be vindicated in court.
Anything more elaborate than cautious approval on non-deposit-
holding, Internet-based financial institutions of modest size should
be a matter for Congress. The OCC’s practice—so far consistent
with this approach—also suggests that the charter-as-policy crowd
are putting too much hope into the licensing mechanism as a
promoter of broad financial sector reform.
A. The State of Fintech
Online providers of financial services, ranging from exchanges
matching buyers and sellers of cryptocurrencies to peer-to-peer lend-
ers, provide bank-like services without holding bank charters. They
are examples of the broadest definitions of shadow banks, even if
they do not, in every case, fit the Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick
borrow-short-to-lend-long-without-a-charter model in every partic-
ular.262 Start-up exchanges can hold money for clients who wish to
trade cryptocurrencies (or anything else),263 which looks a bit like
the taking of deposits. Social lenders take money from individuals
and firms and match them with borrowers.264 They are extending
credit, which is something that banks do. So are online platforms
such as Amazon and Alipay that make loans or extend trade credit
to vendors on their sites.265
262. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 23, at 279-80.
263. See Naveen Saraswat, How Do Cryptocurrency Exchanges Work? And What
Technologies Are Driving Disruption., HACKERNOON (Oct. 14, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/
how-do-cryptocurrency-exchanges-work-and-what-technologies-are-driving-disruption-33d
0007eb018 [https://perma.cc/LC5Y-383K] (explaining cryptocurrency exchanges).
264. See, e.g., About Social Lender, SOCIAL LENDER, https://sociallenderng.com/ [https://
perma.cc/HL3V-224Q].
265. See Spencer Soper & Selina Wang, Amazon’s Lending Business for Online Merchants
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Some fintechs are money transmitters such as Western Union—
they do not take deposits or make loans, but do hold money for cus-
tomers, which is something that banks do.266 Others are payment
processors such as PayPal, but do not really let their customers hold
balances.267 Others are online lenders such as SoFi, Prosper, and
Lending Club, and still others partner with chartered banks to
provide the full panoply of banking services, including (for now)
Varo.268 Finally, there are all those technology firms associated with
cryptocurrencies, including exchanges, hedge funds, and would-be
wallets. As a matter of technology, these fintechs need not distin-
guish between any states in making business decisions—they exist
on the Internet and can serve anyone with Internet access, and the
Internet does not respect state boundaries.269
Gains Momentum, BLOOMBERG (June 8, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-06-08/amazon-s-lending-business-for-online-merchants-gains-momentum
[https://perma.cc/X2QE-TECL]; Alipay Rolls Credit for Consumers, PYMNTS.COM (Jan. 5,
2015), https://www.pymnts.com/news/2015/alipay-rolls-credit-for-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/
Z8PK-FUDM].
266. See Corinne Abrams, Fintech Startups Seek to Shake Up Money-Transfer Industry,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-startups-seek-to-shake-up-
money-transfer-industry-1513679401 [https://perma.cc/W28K-NEJR] (describing the money
transfer industry, which enjoys some regulatory barriers to entry). “Money transmitter laws
are essentially ‘safety and soundness’ laws aimed at protecting consumers from suffering
losses, and have traditionally governed money transfers services like Western Union.” Tu,
supra note 127, at 82.
267. Though, to be sure, “PayPal is regulated by numerous states as a money transmitter
or money service business.” FREDERICK H. MILLER & SARAH JANE HUGHES, 10A UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 6:51 (2019). A review of these electronic payment services may
be found in Eric Pacifici, Making PayPal Pay: Regulation E and Its Application to Alternative
Payment Services, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 89, 95 (2015) (describing them as “designed to
allow consumers to send payments from account to account securely via email, text message,
over the web and sometimes by social media”).
268. “The global market for peer-to-peer lending, which the SEC defines as using websites
that help borrowers and lenders find one another, surged 145 percent in 2013 to $2.8 billion.”
International Warning Issued on Crowdfunding Risks, 8 ACCOUNTING & COMPLIANCE ALERT,
Feb. 7, 2014, 2014 WL 9885749.
269. For this reason, the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to consider
the community in which they operate, would be tricky to apply to social lenders. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2908 (2012). As Michael Barr has explained, the “CRA encourages federally insured
banks and thrifts to meet the credit needs of the entire communities that they serve, including
low- and moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound banking practices.” Michael
S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 513, 517 (2005).
1450 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1397
This sector is already big and has experienced rapid growth. The
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance has speculated that the
worldwide fintech credit market in 2016 amounted to $284 billion,
up from $11 billion in 2013.270 Because these platforms are making
loans and holding money, they are performing some of the features
of the business of banking.271 The OCC has proposed that they be
awarded a banking charter for these reasons—creating a contro-
versy.272
The OCC has observed that these and other start-ups are doing
the things that banks do: “[D]iscounting notes, purchasing bank-
permissible debt securities, engaging in lease-financing transac-
tions, and making loans are forms of lending money. Similarly,
issuing debit cards or engaging in other means of facilitating
payments electronically are the modern equivalent of paying
checks.”273
While the Obama Administration’s comptroller Thomas Curry is
the Agency head who began consideration of the special purpose
fintech charter, it is the Trump Administration’s Joseph Otting who
helmed the Agency when it “announced it will begin accepting ap-
plications for national bank charters from nondepository financial
technology (fintech) companies engaged in the business of banking”
270. Stijn Claessens et al., Fintech Credit Markets Around The World: Size, Drivers and
Policy Issues, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2018, at 33, https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1809e.htm
[https://perma.cc/2DJL-VC4M]. For this reason, Rory Van Loo thinks that competition
regulation should be part of the toolkit applied to fintechs who could get big or join enormous
firms. Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 232, 234-36 (2018).
271. The OCC’s own interpretation as to what counts as the “business of banking” is set
forth in OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE FOR A
NATIONAL BANK, CUMULATIVE (Apr. 2012), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/bankact.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NG4R-AHJN]. For a discussion of the OCC’s flexibility when it comes to
interpreting the “business of banking,” see Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How
Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1077 (2009)
(criticizing “the infinitely elastic concept of the ‘business of banking’ that emerged from the
OCC’s recent interpretations”).
272. See Steve Cocheo, ‘Amazon Bank’ Is Already Here, Without a Charter or Regulatory
Approval, FIN. BRAND (Aug. 20, 2018), https://thefinancialbrand.com/74543/amazon-bank-
checking-account-regulators-charter/ [https://perma.cc/P7JM-YYAH].
273. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/
responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN7D-7YUW].
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on July 31, 2018.274 The Agency observed that its decision to accept
applications was “consistent with bi-partisan government efforts at
federal and state levels.”275 That interest includes the current
Treasury Department, which, also in July 2018, recommended that
“the OCC move forward with prudent and carefully considered
applications for special purpose national bank charters.”276
Complying with varying state charter requirements poses chal-
lenges for fintech firms. Some states require a brick and mortar
presence before a state banking charter can be obtained, but fintech
lenders have business plans premised on the ability to avoid these
sorts of institutional investments.277 Moreover, for a firm that is
doing business across state lines, compliance with varying rules
concerning interest rates, payment terms, and other consumer-
protection-oriented services poses problems.278 An OCC fintech
charter would preempt these various state laws, conditional on some
limitations on federal preemption created by Congress in the wake
of the financial crisis.279
A variety of tech firms have considered applying for a special
charter, but the Treasury Department has forecasted that two sorts
might be particularly interested in the license. Marketplace lenders,
including peer-to-peer and other unorthodox lenders, might be “at-
tracted to an OCC special purpose national bank charter because it
would reduce licensing and regulatory cost[s] by consolidating
supervision under one primary national regulatory structure.”280
Payments companies such as Stripe, Square, and PayPal/Venmo
274. OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications From Financial
Technology Companies, supra note 19.
275. Id.
276. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 94, at 73.
277. See, e.g., Victoria Pallien, The Modern-Day Banking Experience: Brick & Mortar vs.
Digital, FINTECH NEWS (July 12, 2019), https://www.fintechnews.org/the-modern-day-banking-
experience-brick-mortar-vs-digital/ [https://perma.cc/K6P6-TVMX] (discussing how to market
fintech without a brick and mortar building).
278. See Garrett Fischer & Sarah Wade, Fintech: Internet Banking Across State Borders
Triggers Compliance Challenges for State Banks, THOMPSON COBURN LLC (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/bank-check/post/2017-01-20/fintech-internet-
banking-across-state-borders-triggers-compliance-challenges-for-state-banks [https://perma.
cc/73QR-NSNX] (discussing types of interstate compliance issues).
279. Under that statute, consumer protection laws are generally not preempted, and
preemption of such laws may be done on a case-by-case basis. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012).
280. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 94, at 71.
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might “look to the charter to obviate the need to obtain money
transmission licenses in all 50 states.”281
As Faisal Khan has observed, “Obtaining money transmitter
licenses is no easy feat. It involves a large amount of paperwork,
money and time. It can take up to two years to amass all 50 state
licenses.”282 Money transmitters “touch” money that is exchanged
between two private parties, so a bill paid by a consumer to a cable
company through a direct deposit bank account would require a
money transmission license, as would a mortgage payment to any
firm to which a mortgage originator had sold the mortgage.283 This
requirement means that almost all fintechs need these licenses—
unless they obtain a banking charter that would preempt the re-
quirements.
B. Revolutionaries in Waiting
The most serious disrupters of the business of banking—poten-
tially Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—are firms that would
combine big commerce and finance, a combination that has not been
permitted by regulators or legislatures since the founding of the
republic.284
For example, Amazon Loans already extends short-term credit to
businesses selling on its marketplace and has lots of data on how
those businesses are doing, allowing it to make smart loan deci-
sions.285 Apple and Google are handling payments; Google has set up
281. Id.
282. Faisal Khan, How to Get Money Transmitter License Coverage for Your Startup?, BLOG
FAISAL KHAN (Sept. 9, 2016), https://blog.faisalkhan.com/money-transmitter-license-
application-d9dd32286871 [https://perma.cc/MJ2U-XRB6].
283. For a definitive account of the problems of electronic payment transmission, see Tu,
supra note 127, at 86 (“[A]ny person engaging in an activity that constitutes ‘money
transmission’ must be licensed under state law and comply with a host of regulatory
requirements involving financial security, recordkeeping, reporting, and examination.”).
284. The competition risks for banks from commercial entrants are longstanding. “The
entry of nonbank competitors into the field of banking is not new either. Western Union
leveraged its telegram business to introduce money transfers in the nineteenth century.
Securities firms are active lenders and provide numerous deposit products through their
money market funds and other offerings.” John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles:
Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 20 (2016).
285. Amazon Loans Just the Start for ‘Techbanking’, FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2017), https://
www.ft.com/content/4d357d36-4d0c-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b [https://perma.cc/8GCB-WRXS].
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a mobile wallet in India that lets users link phones to bank accounts
to pay for goods in stores and online and to make person-to-person
money transfers.286 Facebook is installing person-to-person PayPal
payments into its Messenger app, and Apple is doing something
similar with its own instant message program.287 These Internet
platforms have enormous balance sheets and could fund financing
operations with other revenue-generating arms, making them both
commercial firms who sell eyeballs to advertisers and financial
service providers who hold money (albeit often only for very brief
periods) and make loans.288
That makes them look like tech giants increasingly engaged in
the business of banking, but the American firms are nothing com-
pared to their Chinese peer, Ant Financial, which has almost in-
stantly become an enormous financial firm largely by processing
payments for Alibaba, the Chinese online retailer, and adding al-
most all of the financial services that the Internet can make pos-
sible.289 Ant originates loans, manages money, and offers customers
access to a money market fund with assets that amounted to $228
billion in 2017.290 It also offers consumer loans to millions of users
on Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms; it does not yet take deposits,
but will when the Chinese central bank grows comfortable with
286. Ingrid Lunden, Google Debuts Tez, a Mobile Payment App for India That Uses Audio
QR to Transfer Money, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 17, 2017, 9:01 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/
09/17/google-debuts-tez-a-mobile-wallet-and-payments-app-for-india/ [https://perma.cc/BUU2-
LSXB].
287. See John Detrixhe, Big Tech Firms Like Amazon Are Eager to Eat the Banking
Industry’s Lunch, QUARTZ (Oct. 26, 2017), https://qz.com/1112460/banks-are-under-threat-
from-big-tech-firms-like-apple-amazon-and-facebook-according-to-mckinsey/ [https://perma.cc/
EP9M-NUGS].
288. See Nat Levy, Amazon’s Advertising Arm Is Getting So Big It Held a Major Conference
for Brands, GEEKWIRE (Oct. 9, 2019, 7:02 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2019/amazons-
advertising-arm-getting-big-held-major-conference-brands/ [https://perma.cc/9LEX-UHGV].
289. John Detrixhe, Ant Financial’s $100 Billion Valuation Would Put It in the Same
League as the World’s Biggest Banks, QUARTZ (Feb. 12, 2018), https://qz.com/1204717/chinas-
ant-financial-plans-to-raise-5-billion-reportedly-at-a-valuation-of-100-billion/ [https://perma.
cc/6CT7-82Q8] (“[I]nvestors think prospects for next-generation companies like Ant Financial
are comparable to top-tier institutions like Goldman Sachs, which had a $94 billion market
cap at the time of writing.”).
290. Shuli Ren, Ant’s Quiet Kingpin in the Storm, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 26, 2017, 7:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-12-27/lucy-peng-must-bend-with-the-wind-to-
get-ant-financial-its-break [https://perma.cc/5E6X-XTXU].
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electronic compliance with know-your-customer requirements.291
Chinese regulators have already given the firm an online banking
license; regulators from Hong Kong are in the process of doing the
same.292 It is, as the Wall Street Journal has put it, “the world’s
largest unicorn,” with an equity value of $150 billion—a level that,
until recently, may have qualified it as “systemically impor-
tant”—that is, potentially too big to fail if it were located in the
United States.293 It is also, as Martin Chorzempa has observed, very
much a component of Chinese policymaking, reflecting the desire of
a government dissatisfied with its young, enormous, and inflexible
banks to explore new ways to extend credit to its growing consumer
class.294
C. The Fight to Charter Fintechs
1. State Outreach to Fintechs
There is already competition for charters in the fintech space—
both New York and Utah are offering licenses that may meet the
needs of fintech firms.295 Two virtual currency exchanges—Gemini,
291. See id.
292. See id. For a discussion of the issues surrounding developing world fintechs, see
Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 1271, 1295-1300 (2016). For a discussion of Hong Kong’s fintech receptivity, see Nisha
Gopalan, Hong Kong’s Ripe for the Virtual Banking Wave, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2019, 8:05
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/hong-kongs-ripe-for-the-virtual-banking-
wave/2019/03/28/657045ac-512e-11e9-bdb7-44f948cc0605_story.html [https://perma.cc/9T9C-
LDQZ]. 
293. Julie Steinberg, Jack Ma’s Ant Financial to Raise $9 Billion, Become World’s Biggest
Unicorn, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2018, 5:42 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-mas-ant-
financial-to-raise-9-billion-become-worlds-biggest-unicorn-1523353351 [https://perma.cc/
P8TV-TDDY]. The United States recently revised its regulations to regulate most intensively
banks with above $250 billion in assets. Donna Borak, Fed: Banks Under $250 Billion
Threshold Get Break on Stress Tests, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2017, 6:23 PM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/fed-banks-under-250-billion-threshold-get-break-on-stress-tests-1485812085
[https://perma.cc/X47J-YAE3]; see also Ren, supra note 290 (discussing how Ant is expected
to earn more than 20 billion yen in profit in 2019).
294. See Martin Chorzempa, How China Leapfrogged Ahead of the United States in the
Fintech Race, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Apr. 26, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/
china-economic-watch/how-china-leapfrogged-ahead-united-states-fintech-race [https://perma.
cc/GZ4T-48T7].
295. See Lalita Clozel, Fintech Firms Look to Enter Banking Via Century-Old Tactic, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-firms-look-to-enter-
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owned by the Winklevoss twins involved in the founding of Face-
book, and itBit—have obtained trust company charters from the
State of New York and hope to operate their firms through that
regulatory channel.296 Square, the small-business-focused payment
processor, has applied for an ILC charter in order to get direct
access to the payments system.297 SoFi, a peer-to-peer lending
business, asked the FDIC (but later withdrew the request) to ap-
prove its application for an ILC charter, in which it raised the
possibility that its business would offer credit cards and take
demand deposits.298
State regulators, led by New York, have already sued to keep
federal regulators from issuing a special fintech banking charter as
something beyond the authority of the OCC, in one case success-
fully.299 In addition to the lawsuits, state regulators have sought to
appeal to fintechs, in part through an expansion of the National
banking-via-century-old-tactic-1518085801 [https://perma.cc/GT6G-22GB] (“The industrial
loan company charter, available in a handful of states and particularly popular in Utah,
allows nonfinancial companies to enter the banking sector without being subject to many of
its restrictions, including oversight by the Federal Reserve.”); Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin.
Servs., DFS Superintendent Vullo Submits Comment Letter to OCC in Opposition of Proposed
Special Purpose National Bank Charter for “Fintech” Companies (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.
dfs.ny.gov/reports-and-publications/press_releases/pr1701171 [https://perma.cc/95JW-6YWS]
(“[Department of Financial Services], as successor to the New York State Banking Depart-
ment, for decades has licensed nonbank financial services companies, including money trans-
mitters, online lenders, and virtual currency exchanges under state law.”).
296. Lalita Clozel, Are Trust Charters the Key to Simplifying Fintech Regulation?, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 8, 2016, 11:29 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/are-trust-charters-
the-key-to-simplifying-fintech-regulation [https://perma.cc/NH3B-REQY].
297. Will Healy, Will the Square Ecosystem Upend the Digital Payments Market?, THE
MOTLEY FOOL, Jan. 10, 2020, https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/01/10/will-the-square-
ecosystem-upend-the-digital-paymen.aspx [https://perma.cc/D4TD-KXDY]; Catherine Shu,
Square Will Apply for an Industrial Loan Company License This Week, TECHCRUNCH (Sept.
7, 2017, 1:24 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/06/square-will-apply-for-an-industrial-loan-
company-license-this-week/ [https://perma.cc/LX2A-F9K5]. It currently works through a bank,
which charges for the service. For a discussion, see Klein, supra note 238.
298. See Brena Swanson, Will Sexual Harassment Claims Cost SoFi Its Bank Charter?,
HOUSINGWIRE (Sept. 18, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/41330-will-
sexual-harassment-claims-cost-sofi-its-bank-charter [https://perma.cc/TDP6-B6AL].
299. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
313 F. Supp. 3d 285, 291 (D.D.C. 2018); Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No.
17 Civ. 3574 (NRB), 2017 WL 6512245, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017). The successful decision
has been appealed. See generally Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d
271, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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Multistate Licensing System (NMLS).300 Founded by the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors, the NMLS is meant to harmonize
various licensing requirements and facilitate data exchanges.301
State bank supervisors have vowed to expand the NMLS to non-
banks and to come up with a harmonized approach to money trans-
mission licenses to spare fintechs the burden of acquiring such
licenses in every state in which they do business.302
These state responses amount to the latest challenge to the not-
so-neat boundary between banking and commerce, which both state
and federal regulators take quite seriously—both states and the
OCC want to give nonbank fintechs something like bank charters.303
The question is whether they should both be able to do so.
2. The Federal Fintech Lawsuits
The intuition behind the litigation against OCC’s fintech charter
has some appeal to those deeply immersed in banking law. Banks
take deposits and fintech firms—at least those eligible for a nation-
al fintech charter—would not.304 This means that the fintech charter
would be given to businesses that are not entirely engaged in every
aspect of the “business of banking,” which is not unprecedented but
rare.305
Or so federal practice suggests. Federal regulators have, in the
past, guarded the line between banking and commerce. The gov-
ernment did not let the commercial giant Walmart get into bank-
ing in 2005, though Walmart customers might have appreciated
300. See John D. Socknat & Stacey L. Valerio, CSBS Agrees to Implement
Recommendations from Fintech Advisory Panel, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/02/20/csbs-agrees-to-implement-recom
mendations-from-fintech-advisory-panel/ [https://perma.cc/J4CW-83K5].
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. Mehrsa Baradaran, The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking, 63 SMU L. REV.
1143, 1143 (2010).
304. See Kate Patrick, Fintech Companies, Community Banks Just Want a ‘Level Playing
Field’, INSIDESOURCES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/fintech-companies-
community-banks-just-want-a-level-playing-field/ [https://perma.cc/FE8J-M3XX]; Rachel
Witkowski, Google and PayPal Explored OCC’s Fintech Charter, Then Walked Away, AM.
BANKER (June 16, 2019, 9:50 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/google-and-paypal-
explored-occs-fintech-charter-then-walked-away [https://perma.cc/D2QT-AN6K].
305. Patrick, supra note 304.
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the ability to do their banking where they did their shopping.306 It
has made it difficult for insurance and other financial companies
to hold federal thrift charters as well.307 Recently it encouraged
commercial entities such as General Electric and insurers such as
306. Baradaran, supra note 303, at 1143-44 (“The ILC, which is the only banking charter
that a commercial firm can operate and is authorized by only a few states, came under intense
scrutiny in 2005 when Wal-Mart applied for an ILC charter and attempted to enter the
banking industry.”). For discussions, see Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost
Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More
Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 524 (2007) (“[W]ith the likes of Wal-Mart
pushing for its own industrial loan corporation, fringe lenders with a history of predatory
lending seeking the same thing may have an extremely powerful ally.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1539
(2007) (“[C]ommercial ownership of ILCs conflicts with the policy of separating banking and
commerce, which has been generally followed in the United States since 1787.”). Wal-Mart
had considered seeking a banking subsidiary for some time. For a discussion, see Elizabeth
R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on
Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 604 (2004) (“Wal-Mart also applied to
acquire a thrift, but its application arrived after the deadline for closing the unitary thrift
loophole set by Gramm-Leach-Bliley.”).
307. In particular, it forbade commercial firms from holding thrift charters in 1999, unless
they held one already. As Arthur Wilmarth has explained, “Federal legislation has closed both
loopholes to any new entry, but leading securities firms and life insurers retain control of
grandfathered depository institutions.” Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the
U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 423. For a discussion, see Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Req-
uiem for a Regulator: The Office of Thrift Supervision’s Performance During the Financial
Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1793 (2011). In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, the
regulation of these financial companies that owned banks changed in a way that some have
found discouraging. As one treatise author has put it,
[I]nsurance companies that raced to obtain unitary thrift holding company
status and those that acquired small thrifts so that they could obtain TARP
funds found that there was consideration to be paid for the goodies. They found
themselves under the supervision of the Federal Reserve and subject to what
they claimed were “impossible” capital requirements, financial statement
requirements and other regulatory burdens, including the Volcker Rule.
KAROL K. SPARKS, INSURANCE ACTIVITIES BANKS § 5.04[D] (Supp. 2018). For example, the CEO
of Thrivent Financial explained that
[i]n the past, Thrivent was regulated by the Office of Thrift Services (OTS),
which got absorbed into the OCC, so today the bank is regulated by the OCC. At
the same time, at the holding company level it went from the OTS to the Federal
Reserve. And there are additional costs and a burden associated with dealing
with two regulators.
Ruth McCambridge, Thrivent Financial Bank Applies to Become Credit Union: Very Rare But
Will It Catch On?, NONPROFIT Q. (Jan. 18, 2012), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2012/01/18/
thrivent-financial-bank-plans-to-become-credit-union-very-rare-but-will-it-catch-on/
[https://perma.cc/U5J7-6MPZ]. Thrivent accordingly gave up its thrift charter and exchanged
it for a credit union charter. See id.
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MetLife with long-standing lending arms to divest or restructure
them.308 And, more broadly, the government has fallen back in love
with the traditional activity restriction, the original form of banking
regulation, exemplified by the congressionally required promulga-
tion of the Volcker Rule precluding banks from engaging in hedge-
fund-like proprietary trading.309
And yet, federal regulatory practice is not uniform. During this
period, the rise of so-called “shadow banks,” or institutions that offer
the same sorts of services as banks, but that do not hold bank char-
ters, has continued apace; firms and even individuals can obtain
financing from money market funds, mortgage originators, mutual
and hedge funds, the commercial paper market, or from peer-to-
peer lenders over the Internet.310
The OCC should win the fintech charter lawsuits due to the
deference it should be afforded to define the business of banking;311
the decision to create a fintech charter has a reasonable basis in
policy. It could improve access to services and rationalize the reg-
ulation of Internet-only businesses. Additionally, the cautious ap-
proach of the Agency does not suggest that big tech such as Google
and Amazon will be able to make use of the charter.
As a general matter, courts have given the Agency deference
when it has expanded the activities in which charter holders may
engage.312 The Supreme Court held as much when it deferred to the
308. See MetLife Completes Spin-Off of Brighthouse Financial, METLIFE (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.metlife.com/about-us/newsroom/2017/august/metlifecompletesspin-off-of-bright
house-financial/ [https://perma.cc/GTX6-FSAA]; Kaja Whitehouse, GE Dismantles GE Capital,
Plans $90B to Investors, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2015, 6:58 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/business/2015/04/10/ge-selling-real-estate-assets/25564855/ [https://perma.cc/
2PRR-3488]. It did so in part by designating GE Capital as systemically significant, a warning
to other commercial financing firms, and an incentive for GE Capital to restructure itself.
See id. For a discussion, see Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-
Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1834-35 (2017).
309. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 308, at 1834; see also Kathleen A. Scott,
Implications of the Volcker Rule for Foreign Banking Entities, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Mar.
2014), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/ce3b3aa3/implica
tions-of-the-volcker-rule-for-foreign-banking-entities [https://perma.cc/9EBJ-VXFD].
310. “Shadow banks that are not regulated like banks, but provide financing like banks,
have taken market share from conventional institutions.” Gordon & Zaring, supra note 171,
at 564.
311. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
259-60 (1995) (holding that the National Banking Act is consistent with permitting a bank to
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Agency’s decision to permit banks to sell annuities;313 we have
already seen that lower courts almost always leave untouched
Agency charter decisions (although they unfortunately do not
always apply Chevron deference to those decisions).314 In Clarke v.
Securities Industry Association, for example, the Court held that the
statutory term “[t]he general business of each national banking
association” could reasonably be construed, as the OCC did, to allow
a bank to establish a discount brokerage affiliate.315
Admittedly, there is modest precedent for the idea that expanding
the sort of businesses that could hold charters would be inconsistent
with the OCC’s mandate.316 A Florida district court once held that
“the core of the business of banking as defined by law and custom is
accepting demand deposits and making commercial loans,” meaning
that operating a business that did not do both things would be in-
consistent with the National Bank Act.317 Another district court held
that an institution that did not make loans could not be chartered
as a national bank because it was not engaged in the business of
banking.318
These few district court cases have been overwhelmed by the
majority of cases deferring to the OCC’s chartering decisions
because those decisions have been cautious and reasonable, and
remain that way today.
So far, most of the antifintech charter lawsuits have been dis-
missed as premature, with one exception.319 One trial court has
sell annuities).
313. See id.
314. See supra Part I.
315. 479 U.S. 388, 404, 409 (1987).
316. For the deference cases, see NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 259-60 (holding that the
National Banking Act is consistent with permitting a bank to sell annuities); Clarke, 479 U.S.
at 404, 409 (finding “[t]he general business of each national banking association” to be
ambiguous, warranting deference).
317. Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Conover, No. 84-1403-CIV-J-12, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22529, at *30 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 1985).
318. See Nat’l State Bank of Elizabeth v. Smith, No. 76-1479, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18184,
at *20, *24 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 1977), rev’d as superseded by statute, 591 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1979).
319. See, e.g., Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285, 291, 298 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The OCC’s national bank chartering
program does not conflict with state law until a charter has been issued.”); Vullo v. Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 17 Civ. 3574 (NRB), 2017 WL 6512245, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2017) (finding claims to be “unripe” as the OCC had not reached a decision).
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ruled that the OCC can only regulate deposit-taking institutions,
and so offering a charter to fintechs that do not take deposits is be-
yond its powers.320 But because the agency already regulates credit
card banks that essentially do not take deposits, the decision is
unpersuasive.321
3. Policy Implications of the Fintech Charter Fight
Social lenders and electronic payments processors are different
from brick-and-mortar banks, to be sure, but there are good policy
reasons to support the fintech charter. One is mere consistency: if
the business of banking can include investment management and
document storage (which banks offer through their safe deposit
boxes), then it could also include peer-to-peer loans and loan ser-
vicing, and also investment accounts at online exchanges. The latter
businesses are no more different from the business of taking de-
posits and making loans than are the former ones.
Moreover, as we will see, the OCC-proposed fintech charter would
charter firms that are not taking all of the risks of a bank, that are
not a threat to the deposit insurance fund, and yet, that want to
extend credit in a bank-like way that makes the OCC’s oversight
understandable.322 To explore why this is the case, and to make
sense of the OCC’s charter expansion ambitions, a deeper under-
standing of its historical approach and fintech charter rollout is
called for; that consideration follows in Part V.D.
Giving fintechs a federal special purpose charter does not quite
allow them to do all the things that banks do, including, most
notably, taking deposits.323 But it does federalize the law that these
businesses must comply with in a way that is consistent with their
Internet presence, which knows no state borders. Moreover, as we
will see, the OCC’s cautious approach to fintech chartering is
320. Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 278-82
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
321. For a discussion, see Lissa L. Broome, Banking on Blockchain, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
169, 187-90 (2019).
322. See infra Part V.D.
323. See Patrick, supra note 304.
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consistent with its regulatory mandate, at least when afforded
Chevron deference.324
The fintech charter looks less reasonable, however, if the worst is
assumed over who might be eligible for it. The largest Internet gi-
ants increasingly all have a payments processing arm, as we have
seen.325 Given these potentially enormous bigtech businesses, a spe-
cial purpose charter would go a long way towards eliminating the
line between banking and the bulk of e-commerce and is the sort of
major question that should be left to Congress, rather than to an
agency, which is the final policy recommendation of the Article.326
The business of banking is capacious enough to apply to lending
done through the Internet—at least provided that lending or loan
servicing through the Internet is the only thing that the Internet
firm does.
Permitting an enormous payments system to obtain a bank
charter is not a totally unreasonable (at least as a matter of textual
construction) interpretation of the National Banking Act—other
countries have already offered online banking licenses to their
Internet payments giants, and nothing in the statute requires new
entrants into the banking services market to be small.327 But it
would undo the traditional separation of banking and commerce. In
a Chevron deference era where financial agencies have broad
statutory authority—the President has mused about doing a centi-
billion dollar capital gains tax cut through a Treasury Department
letter—there must a place for the “major questions” exception to the
doctrine if it has any hope of stabilizing the administrative state, as
well as allowing for policy innovation.328
Awarding the Internet’s biggest firms—firms engaged in search,
social networking, and telecommunications—with banking charters
really would erase the boundaries between banking and commerce,
324. See infra Part V.D.
325. See supra Part V.B.
326. The controversial doctrine provides that “an agency can issue a major rule—i.e., one
of great economic and political significance—only if it has clear congressional authorization
to do so.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 855 F.3d 381, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
327. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing National Banking Act), and
notes 289-94 and accompanying text (discussing China’s Ant Financial).
328. See Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Trump Administration Is Divided Over Tax
Cut for Investors, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/us/
politics/trump-capital-gains-tax-cut.html [https://perma.cc/FD2R-BZ2L].
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and such a big change in policy really is a matter for Congress,
rather than the OCC.
D. The OCC’s Cautious Expansion of the National Charter
The OCC charter extension model is best understood as one that
cautiously enables established financial institutions to obtain li-
censes for new lines of business that do not fit within the Agency’s
regulatory model—in that sense it is a little different from the
fintech charter, which would allow new entrants to make loans and
process payments. This Part shows that the Agency has never used
the special purpose charter to upend what banks can do; instead it
is a cautious charter innovator. Credit cards, trust holdings, and
shelf charters represent a relaxation of regulatory requirements for
already trusted investors or banks who wish to expand their
banking businesses. The fact that there are so few special charters
suggests that the Agency views its evolutionary responsibilities
circumspectly.
The OCC claimed authority for special purpose banks in a reg-
ulation promulgated in 2003, which provides:
The OCC charters a national bank under the authority of the
National Bank Act of 1864, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The
bank may be a special purpose bank that limits its activities to
fiduciary activities or to any other activities within the business
of banking. A special purpose bank that conducts activities other
than fiduciary activities must conduct at least one of the
following three core banking functions: Receiving deposits;
paying checks; or lending money.329
The Agency, along with Congress, has insisted on participation in
the “business of banking” as a criterion for charter eligibility since
329. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2019) (emphasis added). For a discussion of this regulation,
which was surprisingly never challenged in court, see Conference of State Bank Supervisors
v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285, 292 (D.D.C. 2018)
(discussing the rule and observing that pursuant to the regulation, “the OCC could charter
a special purpose bank that does not receive deposits, so long as the bank pays checks or lends
money”); Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and Op-
erations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 70122 (Dec. 17, 2003) (adopting
the regulation).
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its founding.330 Its special purpose charters have reflected this in-
sistence.
Its oldest special charter has been used by the subsidiaries of
ordinary banks that want to offer their customers credit cards in
addition to the usual deposit and loan offerings. Credit card banks
were permitted to obtain federal charters if they engaged only in
credit card operations and did not, for the most part, accept
deposits, meaning that they would not need to obtain deposit in-
surance from the FDIC and be subject to its regulations.331 The
credit card bank usually exists as a bank affiliate that can get
around state usury laws, which set maximum rates of interest for
loans—rates that credit card issuers are capable of exceeding be-
cause of the OCC’s national preemption power.332 As of January
2018, only nine banks had taken the opportunity to become credit
card banks and most of these are affiliates of other OCC-regulated
banks.333
More popular has been the special trust charter—although it has
not been much more popular. Fifty-five banks hold the trust char-
ter; again, these are usually affiliates of other banks.334 Trust banks
are special purpose entities designed to hold assets identified in a
contract between two private parties (in this way they “take
deposits” and are thus engaged in the business of banking, but they
do not loan out the resources entrusted to them).335 Their profits
330. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
331. PAULINE B. HELLER & MELANIE L. FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 2-27
(rev. ed. 2011). For a guide on the supervision that credit card banks face, see generally
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: CREDIT CARD
LENDING (2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-
handbook/credit-card-lending/pub-ch-credit-card.pdf [https://perma.cc/49V4-82GC].
332. “BHCs have historically used specialized credit card banks to ‘seek relief from onerous
usury restrictions’ in their home state.” Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 8, at 170.
333. For the current list of credit card banks, see Financial Institution Lists, OFF.
COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/licensing/national-banks-fed-
savings-assoc-lists/index-active-bank-lists.html [https://perma.cc/ZP97-DSE4]. Moreover, the
OCC is permitted to charter a credit card bank that is exempt from requirements of the Bank
Holding Company Act. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at
51-54.
334. For the current list of national trust banks, see Financial Institution Lists, supra note
333.
335. As Omarova and Tahyar have put it, “Trust companies generally engage in the
business of holding and managing money in a fiduciary or representative capacity.” Omarova
& Tahyar, supra note 8, at 173.
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come from fees charged to manage the assets held in trust; trust
companies have a fiduciary obligation to put the interests of the
beneficiaries of the trust ahead of their own.336 Trust banks are not
insured by the FDIC in most cases, a fact that may have induced the
OCC to stop chartering trust banks for years, worried about the
prospect of being on the hook for their failure.337 The real advantage
for trusts, as with federal credit card companies, is that the national
charter preempts many state banking laws, enabling the trust to
operate essentially nationwide.338
The OCC has occasionally evinced a willingness to charter
“bankers’ banks,” and has asserted the power to do so, though no
such banks have yet received a federal charter.339 A banker’s bank
is like a nineteenth-century clearinghouse in that it is owned by
the banks and is intended to make cross-bank payments easier
and to serve as a backstop for banks that find themselves illiquid,
but not insolvent.340
Finally, in the wake of the financial crisis, the OCC created a
“shelf charter,” allowing investor groups to prequalify for a national
bank charter so that the group could compete in an auction for a
failed bank, “assured that the group already has preliminary
approval for a national charter into which it could fold the acquired
entity.”341
The shelf charter, like the other special charters issued by OCC,
did not enjoy much take-up, perhaps because the OCC made
336. See id. at 173-74.
337. For the FDIC’s approach to trust banks, see Trust Examination Manual, FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/trustmanual/section_10/section_x.
html [https://perma.cc/K8KP-XP4Z].
338. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2012). 
339. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 27, at 1 (“New banks may
be chartered for full-service or special purpose operations, such as ... bankers’ banks.”).
340. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(d)(1) (2019) (“Bankers’ bank means a bank owned exclusively (except
to the extent directors’ qualifying shares are required by law) by other depository institutions
or depository institution holding companies (as that term is defined in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813), the activities of which are limited by its articles of
association exclusively to providing services to or for other depository institutions.”)
341. MALLOY, supra note 55, § 2.02. The Agency also permitted “inflatable charters,”
whereby a very small national bank would be acquired with the presumption that it would
acquire other failing institutions; both the shelf charter and the inflatable charter (which is
less easy to track, as the Agency does not announce the awarding of it) are designed to make
it easier for private equity firms to take over failing financial institutions. OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 273, at 15.
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obtaining a shelf charter quite difficult—managing officers of the
would-be bank had to be identified and available and shelf charter
applicants underwent rigorous oversight.342 Nonetheless, in 2010,
the Agency allowed Bond Street Bank to acquire two failing Florida
banks via a shelf charter.343 The OCC authorized another shelf-
chartered bank to acquire two small banks in Florida and one in
South Carolina that year as well.344 These shelf charters assisted
federal regulators with their crisis cleanup and were essentially
the last new-ish charters given out by the Agency for years.
In the past, the OCC also chartered community development
banks, which are designed to encourage growth in underserved or
low-income areas, and cash management banks, which are banking
subsidiaries that manage the cash flow of larger business custom-
ers.345
These modest success stories should not obscure a pattern and
practice that disfavors unconventional charters. The OCC has met
the needs of credit card banks and trust banks, or, more accurately,
the need of nationally chartered banks to operate credit card or
trust affiliates, and the market for those needs is admittedly not
large. However, it has not waded into shadow banking with charters
available to all who wish, suggesting that it is unlikely to change
things with the special purpose fintech charter.
342. Thomas P. Vartanian & Gordon L. Miller, 2009 Developments in FDIC Failed Bank
Resolutions, BANKING L. COMMITTEE J. (A.B.A. BUS. L. SECTION), Nov. 2009, at 5-6, https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/newsletters/CL
130000/full-issue-200910.pdf [https://perma.cc/77RE-N9K8].
343. OCC Approves First Use of “Shelf Charter” to Acquire Failed Bank, OFF. COMPTROLLER
CURRENCY (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-
occ-2010-8.html# [https://perma.cc/NPG8-CTJU]; OCC Approves Premier American Bank,
National Association to Acquire Second Failed Bank, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (Jan. 29,
2010), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-12.html# [https://
perma.cc/264G-FQJD].
344. OCC Approves Use of Second Shelf Charter to Acquire Three Failed Banks, OFF.
COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (July 16, 2010), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2010/nr-occ-2010-82.html# [https://perma.cc/75VJ-VXT9].
345. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 273, at 3 n.5.
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E. The Slow Adoption of the Fintech Charter
On July 31, 2018, the OCC invited fintech firms to apply for a
special purpose fintech charter.346 In evaluating applications, the
OCC indicated that it “will use its existing chartering standards and
procedures for processing applications,” but that it would not re-
quire fintech charter applicants to take deposits and obtain deposit
insurance.347
The decision by the Agency to accept charters has been one of long
gestation. In 2013, Comptroller Thomas Curry indicated that he was
interested in using the special purpose charter to offer fintech
companies federal banking oversight. In 2016, the OCC published
a white paper on the possibility, in which it indicated that it saw
three potential advantages for fintech companies in obtaining a
charter.348 The first was reassurance: “[A]pplying a bank regulatory
framework to fintech companies will help ensure that these com-
panies operate in a safe and sound manner so that they can ef-
fectively serve the needs of customers.”349 The second was the
advantage of the nationwide preemption of state banking laws,
which simplifies regulation, and, as the OCC put it, “will help
promote consistency in the application of law and regulation across
the country and ensure that consumers are treated fairly.”350 Third,
the Agency thought that new charterholders, with their different
business models, might be good for banking and cause banking
innovation, which could “make the federal banking system stron-
ger.”351 The OCC mused in the white paper about which fintech
firms might be eligible for licenses—they would have to be engaged
in one aspect of the business of banking—and how the Agency might
modify its capital, business plan, and other regulatory requirements
346. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT, supra note
181, at 1.
347. Id. at 3; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 18, at 2
(considering applications by fintech firms that did not take deposits).
348. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 9, at 2; see also OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 273, at 2.
349. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 273, at 2.
350. Id.
351. Id.
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to suit the specialized charter market.352 The Agency requested
comments on the white paper.353
The OCC then proposed a rule indicating that it “may charter
other special purpose banks with business models that are within
the business of banking,” and that “[a]s part of the agency’s
initiative on responsible innovation in the Federal banking system,
the OCC [was] considering how best to implement a regulatory
framework that [was] receptive to responsible innovation, such as
advances in financial technology.”354
The OCC also sought comments from the public as to “whether it
would be appropriate for the OCC to consider granting a special
purpose national bank charter to a fintech company.”355 The OCC
explained that it was considering various categories of fintech
companies, including marketplace lenders that provide loans to
consumers and small businesses, companies that provide payment-
related services, businesses that engage in digital currencies and
distribute-ledger technology, and companies that provide financial
planning and wealth management products and services.356 For his
part, Comptroller Curry waxed enthusiastic: “We will be issuing
charters to fintech companies engaged in the business of banking
because it is good for consumers, businesses, and the federal
banking system.”357
Curry’s successors have agreed. One of them has said that using
the special purpose charter for fintech companies would be a “good
idea.”358 Acting Comptroller Noreika said that fintech charterholders
would not be subject to the Bank Holding Company Act, which
means that they would not be subject to supervision by the Federal
352. See id. at 5-14.
353. See id. at 15-16.
354. Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 81 Fed. Reg. 62,837 (Sept. 13, 2016).
355. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 273, at 2.
356. Id.
357. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at LendIt USA 2017 5 (Mar.
6, 2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-27.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EP6W-2RPM].
358. Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before the Exchequer
Club 5 (July 19, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-
82.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6CC-ETVC] (“[C]ompanies that offer banking products and services
should be allowed to apply for national bank charters so that they can pursue their businesses
on a national scale if they choose, and if they meet the criteria and standards for doing so.”).
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Reserve (the Fed).359 His successor, Joseph Otting, has said that
although he was “not sure what it looks like and how it’s funded,”
for fintech charters, “there’s a space there that a technology solution
can solve.”360
The Agency then invited fintech firms interested in obtaining a
special purpose charter to “maintain an open dialogue” with the
OCC beginning with exploratory precharter meetings.361 It consid-
ered a “regulatory sandbox,” or pilot program, waiving certain
regulations that would permit some banks to explore some fintech
applications in a safe harbor from regulatory enforcement.362 The
OCC ultimately rejected the idea that fintech might be exempted
from the most serious requirements that normal banks have.363
Amazon, Google, and Apple have been taking those meetings and
have banded together to form a Washington lobbying group,
Financial Innovation Now, which is on the record as supporting the
fintech charter.364
In a draft supplement to its licensing manual designed to handle
new special charters, the OCC indicated that firms that might be el-
igible for the fintech charter could not “inappropriate[ly] commin-
gl[e] banking and commerce.”365 The OCC has indicated that the
359. Lalita Clozel, Why Are Amazon, PayPal Meeting with Bank Regulators?, AM. BANKER
(Sept. 29, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-are-amazon-paypal-
meeting-with-bank-regulators [https://perma.cc/SU2B-QGTY] (“An institution with a fintech
charter, ‘wouldn’t be a bank for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act.’”).
360. Dan Cohen, Comptroller Otting: A New Ally for a Fintech Charter?, FINTECH L. BLOG
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.fintechlawblog.com/2018/01/comptroller-otting-a-new-ally-for-a-
fintech-charter/ [https://perma.cc/AK6H-C7BM].
361. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 18, at 4.
362. Sara Merken, OCC Fintech Pilot Goes On After Curry Makes Way for Trump Team,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 25, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-
law/occ-fintech-pilot-goes-on-after-curry-makes-way-for-trump-team [https://perma.cc/57XF-
NZYS].
363. Todd H. Baker, OCC Can’t Claim Victory Despite Dismissal of Fintech Charter Suit,
AM. BANKER (Sept. 16, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/occ-cant-
claim-victory-despite-dismissal-of-fintech-charter-suit [https://perma.cc/4EA9-2KMK] (dis-
cussing that fintech banks remain subject to most of the regulatory oversight of a full-service
bank).
364. See JD Alois, Financial Innovation Now: We Support the OCC Fintech Charter,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2017, 12:32 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/01/
94847-financial-innovation-now-support-occ-fintech-charter/ [https://perma.cc/8WK7-YZDK];
Clozel, supra note 359.
365. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINANCIAL
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special purpose charter will not be available to fintechs that seek to
take deposits.366 The Treasury Department agrees that this should
not be the case, as fintechs “should not be permitted to accept FDIC-
insured deposits, to reduce risks to taxpayers.”367
However, there have not yet been any fintech charter applicants,
as this Article goes to publication, perhaps because of the OCC’s
circumspect vision, litigation risk, or external conditions.
F. Policy Implications
The OCC is funded by fees assessed on charter holders, and so the
Agency always has an incentive to grow its charter and customer
base. But regulatory budget building is not the only reason for
fintech charters.368 In an era where regulators worry about the
growing importance of “shadow banking” and firms that offer bank-
like services without actually holding a bank charter, the idea of
bringing fintech lenders into the fold has regulatory appeal.369
Capital requirements could be imposed on these firms, making them
capable of surviving an economic or other shock.370 Also, enabling
new entries into the financial system should increase competition
and impose market discipline on financial firms, an outcome which
has long been a goal of regulatory policy and one espoused by all
regulators who, like the OCC, signed on to the second version of the
Basel Capital Adequacy accord, which made “market discipline” one
of the three pillars on which it based market supervision.371
Obtaining whatever licenses are necessary to operate across
state lines offers the prospect of regulatory complexity, meaning
that these sorts of fintech firms might want a federal charter to
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 15 (2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/
responsible-innovation/summary-explanatory-statement-fintech-charters.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6EG8-SH4D].
366. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 273, at 7.
367. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 94, at 73.
368. See About Us, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://occ.treas.gov/about/index-about.
html [https://perma.cc/9D7J-DSXW].
369. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
370. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OVERVIEW OF THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 12-
13 (2001), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca02.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6HL-P8UR].
371. For a discussion of Basel II, see id. at 1.
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essentially swap many regulators for one.372 Although it would be
inaccurate to call OCC regulation particularly “light touch,” the
Comptroller does not have a maximum interest rate or the sort of
usury provisions that many state regulators do impose.373 Moreover,
a charter could come with (though it need not) access to the Fed’s
payment systems, which might offer efficiencies for fintech lend-
ers.374 Currently, fintech firms rely on partnerships with suitably
chartered banks to access the national payment system managed by
the Fed; the firms may wish to cut out the middleman.375
The facts on the ground appear to indicate that the OCC is going
to be a slow mover in the race to regulate fintech, and the early
charter interest still leaves open the question about what to do with
Amazon’s payments processor and Google and Apple’s wallet
payment processors. This record offers comfort that the OCC’s
fintech charter would be incremental.
The change a different kind of fintech charter could make to the
business of banking would involve a change in the traditional
separation of banking and commerce, which, as the Acting Comp-
troller said in 2017, “reaches back to the origins of banking in the
United States.”376 Acting Comptroller Noreika indicated that he may
be willing to rethink this very traditional separation, because
“mixing banking and commerce can generate efficiencies that de-
liver more value to customers and can improve bank and commer-
cial company performance with little additional risk.”377 But this
position was resisted. Community banks have feared the entrance
of nonbank commercial businesses into the business of banking,
and, although the Agency has not committed itself to offering a
fintech charter to a nonbanking company, underlying some of the
debate over fintech chartering is this central question of whether
banking should continue to be so separate from commerce, given
that, in the technology space, commercial firms are increasingly
doing things that banks used to do.378
372. See supra notes 196-98.
373. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
375. Varo is an example. See supra Part IV.A.1.
376. Noreika, supra note 109, at 3.
377. Id. at 10.
378. See, e.g., The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing Before the H.
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That is why my prescription follows from this state of affairs. The
OCC should not leap to give charters to any fintech firm. This would
demolish the boundary between commerce and banking in a way
that would be ill-considered and insufficiently democratic. Doing so
would challenge the constraint on regulators that is not always
covered by their legal obligations, in that it would upend the settled
expectations of regulated industry in a relatively dramatic fashion.
Once regulatory initiatives have been institutionalized in a way that
has affected investments, it is often better for Congress to do the
upending, with its political accountability, than it is for regulators
to change everything.
Such legislation would undo the separation of banking and
commerce, a principle that banking regulators have carefully ob-
served for centuries.379 Whether the Internet’s commercial giants
should be able to offer their customers banking services is the sort
of “major question” that an agency cannot and should not answer
with an interpretation of its existing regulatory authority.380 The
chartering of Amazon’s, Google’s, or Apple’s payment subsidiaries
should only be permitted upon the passage of a fintech chartering
act, and even then, Congress may want to think carefully about
whether these instant financial giants, who can rely on the enor-
mous balance sheets of their parent companies, should be permitted
to enter the business of banking.
Finally, this fulsome review of the state of the bank charter
suggests two broader conclusions about the state of licensing today.
The first is that agencies will not always seek to expand their
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 38 (2007) (statement of James P. Ghiglieri, Jr., President,
Alpha Community Bank, on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of America)
(“[Nonbank] charter[s] threaten[ ] our Nation’s historic separation of banking and commerce
and undermine[ ] our system of holding company supervision.”).
379. See Noreika, supra note 109, at 3 (acknowledging that this separation principle
“reaches back to the origins of banking in the United States”).
380. Accordingly, this Article endorses the controversial-to-some “major question” exception
to Chevron deference. Critics have said that “the major questions doctrine has the potential
to broadly empower the judiciary to strike down any executive action that it deems sufficiently
‘major,’ even if the action in no way implicates the Constitution.” Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 328-29, 328 n.3 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wynn, J., concurring),
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018). But while the major questions exception to Chevron does not
really seem to have a great logical basis, it is entirely necessary given that the logic of
Chevron could permit agencies to engage in almost any kind of regulation provided it could
establish that doing so would be in the “public interest.”
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regulatory turf by continually expanding the scope of the license.
The OCC has hesitated to expand its charter to cover new kinds of
financial firms, and only recently refused to give out any charters
at all, missing out on the licensing fees that would have contrib-
uted to the Agency’s bottom line. Licensing can, no doubt, be
inefficient, bureaucratic, and opaque. But it does not always lead to
mission creep. The second is that the high-end licensing of danger-
ous businesses—and banks can be dangerous—is often elaborate
and complicated, requiring an investment in legal talent, compli-
ance resources, and requiring sophistication in Washington as well
as in the underlying business. Licensing is its own sort of big
business, especially when it comes to cases where the costs of a
mistake are high.
CONCLUSION
Reform of the financial charter in the United States is on the
table. The actual practice of the Agency that makes national charter
grants suggests that neither policy will be easy to realize. Because
that cautious approach is consistent with the development of a fin-
tech industry that would not undo the separation of banking from
commerce, the OCC’s special purpose fintech charter should be
embraced. The OCC—and the courts—should make clear that the
Agency’s chartering decisions are reviewable subject to Chevron
deference and a hard look at the facts—a standard that is probably
best expressed as a requirement that the Agency make a reasonable
decision. Once the OCC clarifies its approach to chartering—and
updates it if it decides to modify its standards for charter grants—
the chartering regime will stand on firm enough ground. Only
Congress, however, should make the decision to vastly expand the
ground of chartering to the payment systems of the biggest technol-
ogy firms.
